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Abstract
Essays on Foreign Firms Following Deregistration from U.S. Exchanges
by
Kathleen Michelle Bakarich
Adviser: Professor Joseph Weintrop

In 2007 the SEC introduced Rule 12h-6, which significantly reduced the requirements for crosslisted firms to leave U.S. markets. While the benefits and costs of cross-listing in the U.S. have
been widely analyzed in prior literature, questions as to the impact of deregistration on firms,
investors, and other parties have been raised given the increase in foreign firms leaving the U.S.
over the past decade. In addition, the growing global adoption of International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) and worldwide regulatory developments over this time period have brought
changes to the home markets to which deregistering firms return potentially influencing the impact
of deregistration. This dissertation consists of two chapters that analyze samples of foreign crosslisted firms that voluntarily deregister from U.S. equity markets. In Chapter 1, I examine whether
a benefit of cross-listing, improved accounting quality, is impacted when foreign firms deregister.
In Chapter 2, I examine whether a cost of cross-listing, a fee premium paid to auditors, is impacted
when foreign firms deregister. Additionally, in both chapters I analyze the characteristics of the
home market that influence these associations.
Chapter 1: For a sample of 122 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from 2004 through 2012,
I find that deregistration from the U.S. is associated with greater abnormal accruals, a lower
likelihood of reporting a loss, and less timely recognition of economic losses compared to both
before the firm deregistered and to a matched control firm that still maintains a U.S. cross-listing.
iv

Upon further examination, I find the decrease in accounting quality is not significant for firms
returning to home markets that require IFRS, but rather the significant decrease is attributable only
to foreign firms returning to non-IFRS environments.

Additional tests show that the level of

regulatory quality in the home market, relative to the U.S., is not a significant mitigating factor in
the negative association between deregistration and accounting quality. These findings imply that,
after controlling for country and regulatory effects, accounting standards play a significant role in
explaining the relationship between deregistration from U.S. exchanges and financial reporting
quality.
Chapter 2: For a sample of 105 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from 2004 through 2013,
I find that deregistration is associated with a decrease in audit fees compared to both before the
firm deregistered and to a matched control firm that still maintains a U.S. cross-listing. This
significant decrease is attributable only to foreign firms returning to non-IFRS environments,
which is consistent with the high complexity and effort associated with auditing IFRS financial
statements. Additional tests show the level of legal liability auditors are exposed to in the home
market is not a significant mitigating factor in the negative association between deregistration and
audit fees. These findings imply that, after controlling for country and legal effects, the difference
in the complexity of accounting standards is a significant factor explaining the impact of
deregistration on audit fees.
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Chapter 1: Going back home: how deregistration from the U.S. impacts foreign firms’
accounting quality
1.1

Introduction
With a wide variety of accounting principles and varying degrees of corporate governance

worldwide, one way for firms from countries with weaker accounting and enforcement
environments to signal improvements in financial reporting is to cross-list in the U.S. By
subjecting themselves to more stringent disclosure requirements and regulations, cross-listed firms
raise market valuations through mechanisms such as increasing transparency and improving
investor protection (Stulz 1999; Coffee 1999; Reese and Weisbach 2002; Pagano, Röell, and
Zechner 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2004). These mechanisms are also associated with
significant increases in accounting quality (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman 2003b). Historically, one
cost of listing in the U.S., however, was the inability to easily delist given the prohibitively high
transaction costs of deregistration.
The adoption of SEC Rule 12h-6 in March 2007 changed the cross-listing landscape by
relaxing the deregistration requirements for foreign firms listed in the U.S. The SEC argued this
amendment “should result in reduced costs to issuers in determining whether they can terminate
their Exchange Act reporting obligations” (SEC 2007b, 19) because deregistration requirements
will be based on more easily obtainable information and will not require annual re-verification.1
An expected benefit of the amendment was that it “should over time remove an impediment to
foreign company access and participation in U.S. public capital markets while still providing U.S.
investors with the protections afforded by our Exchange Act reporting regime” (SEC 2007b, 81).
However, the passing of Rule 12h-6 resulted in a growing number of foreign firms voluntarily

1

Rule 12h-6 considers the requirements for deregistration to be met if the ratio of average U.S. daily trading to
worldwide trading volume is less than 5%. This replaces the former requirement that the number of U.S. resident
record holders must be less than 300. The previous rule was problematic for many foreign firms because the effort to
obtain address records to verify the specific country of residence of its investors was costly and difficult (SEC 2007b).
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deregistering from U.S. markets, coinciding with a decreasing trend in the number of foreign firms
listed on major U.S. exchanges (see Figure 1.1). These deregistrations even eclipsed new crosslistings in some years (see Figure 1.2).
It is within this setting that I test the association between deregistration from the U.S. and
accounting quality. The association between improvements in accounting quality and cross-listing
appear to be specific to firms subject to SEC rules and disclosure and not firms cross-listed on the
OTC or in other overseas markets (Lang et al. 2003b). Deregistration from the U.S. releases
foreign firms from the SEC’s oversight and Exchange Act reporting, which may trigger a change
in firms’ financial reporting environments. The SEC has voiced its concern regarding this potential
impact of deregistration on investors, and in particular, the role that a foreign firm’s home market
may play in either exacerbating or mitigating that effect:
“If Exchange Act disclosure requirements provide more information or protection to U.S.
or other investors than is provided in an issuer's primary trading market, then all investors,
both U.S. and foreign, may suffer the costs of losing that information and protection upon
Exchange Act termination. Conversely, in countries that have similar regulatory regimes
and levels of investor protection the impact of U.S. deregistration may be mitigated” (SEC
2007b).
Thus, after first examining the association between deregistration and accounting quality to ensure
there is an effect to disentangle, I then further examine whether this association is impacted by the
level of reporting and disclosure information or regulation in firms’ home markets.
Given the U.S. is long associated with the highest levels of earnings quality (or lowest
levels of earnings management) relative to other countries (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003;
Francis and Wang 2008), the SEC requires cross-listed firms to either reconcile net income and
shareholders’ equity to U.S. GAAP or report their financial statements in full accordance with U.S.

2

GAAP.2 This requirement was in place until 2007, when changes in the global accounting
environment led the SEC to amend its policy. Since the time many firms originally cross-listed in
the U.S., the use of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has grown worldwide.
Recognizing that “financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS as issued by the
[International Accounting Standards Board] IASB are of sufficient quality” (SEC 2007a, 84), the
SEC removed the reconciliation requirement to U.S. GAAP for foreign firms using IFRS.
With the widespread adoption of IFRS in recent years, many deregistering firms return to
home markets which mandate the use of these global accounting standards. For example, in the
press release announcing Norwegian firm Norsk Hydro’s intention to delist from the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) in October 2007 after twenty-one years of cross-listing, the firm asserted
that, among other reasons:
“Internationalization of capital markets and the introduction of International Financial
Reporting Standards as the primary financial reporting standards in Europe have also
significantly reduced the need for and benefit of multiple stock-exchange listings…
delisting and deregistration will enable us to simplify financial reporting processes, while
maintaining the same high-quality financial reporting and disclosures.” (Norsk Hydro
2007).
This statement indicates that for this firm, and other IFRS users, deregistration from the U.S. is
not expected to significantly change financial reporting quality given their home-market reporting
and disclosure environments are viewed as providing the same high-quality as the U.S. If changes
in firms’ accounting standards and disclosure environments drive changes in accounting quality
following deregistration, and IFRS provides comparable reporting quality, then it is expected that
firms from countries with lower quality home market accounting standards (i.e. non-IFRS) will

For example, in examining Daimler-Benz’s 1993 decision to cross-list in the U.S., Ball (2004) argues the firm’s
change to U.S. GAAP bonded it to forego the flexibility in financial reporting permitted under German GAAP and
commit itself to publicly report losses in a timely fashion, which help to monitor and discipline managers’ actions.
2

3

exhibit larger deregistration effects, while firms from countries using IFRS will exhibit
insignificant changes around deregistration.
The incentive to follow accounting standards, however, may depend on the underlying
enforcement mechanisms firms face in the market, which is particularly important in an
international context (Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000). Leuz and Wysocki (2015) argue that “it is
far from clear whether IFRS will be superior, or effective, in countries that have different
institutions and may lack potentially complementary institutions to support the effective
application and enforcement of the uniform global standards” (p. 88). Christensen, Hail, and Leuz
(2013) find that it is changes in enforcement rather than changes in accounting standards that drive
changes in market liquidity. Following these arguments, the source of the relationship between
deregistration and accounting quality is more likely to be associated with the regulatory quality of
the home market, rather than the accounting environment. It is then expected that firms from
countries with weaker enforcement environments compared to the U.S. will exhibit larger
decreases in accounting quality following deregistration, while firms from countries with
comparable enforcement environments will exhibit no significant changes.
The sample consists of 122 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from 2004 through 2012.
Firms are considered to have higher financial reporting quality when abnormal accruals are lower,
the probability of reporting a loss is greater, and economic losses are reported in a timely manner
(e.g. Basu 1997; Jones 1991; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Francis, Michas, and Seavey 2013).
These measures capture properties of earnings and have been used extensively in prior literature
examining determinants of earnings quality (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010).3 I find that a
deregistration from the U.S. is associated with greater abnormal accruals, a lower likelihood of

3

These tests are also robust to using earnings smoothing measures from Leuz et al. (2003) as proxies for financial
reporting quality. See Section 1.5 and Tables 1.6 and 1.7 for further information.
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reporting a loss, and less timely recognition of economic losses compared to both before the firm
deregistered and to a matched control firm that still maintains a U.S. cross-listing.
To determine if this relationship is affected by the accounting standards and disclosure or
regulation and enforcement in deregistering firms’ home markets, I follow prior literature and
“exploit institutional differences across settings to tease out the sources of cross-listing effects”
(Leuz 2003a, 352).4 Given some of the evidence cited above regarding the comparable highquality of IFRS, I classify firms based on their home market accounting environments (i.e. IFRS
or non-IFRS) to test if the negative association between deregistration and accounting quality is
mitigated when firms return to accounting and disclosure environments comparable to the U.S.
Similarly, to determine if the source of the deregistration effects is the regulatory environment, I
use the World Bank’s Regulatory Quality index to capture firms returning to home markets with
comparable regulatory quality.5

In doing so, I test if the negative association between

deregistration and accounting quality is mitigated when firms return to enforcement environments
comparable to the U.S.
When controlling for the home market accounting environment, I find the decrease in
accounting quality is not significant for firms returning to home markets that require IFRS, but
rather the significant decrease is attributable only to foreign firms returning to non-IFRS
environments. On the other hand, when controlling for the regulatory environment in the home
market, I find the negative association between deregistration and accounting quality is not
mitigated by home markets with higher regulatory quality. When including both variables in the

4

Leuz (2003a) argues that prior research has focused on the main or average effect of cross-listing rather than
potentially more interesting interactive effects of institutional variables, which are important for analyzing crosslisting effects in cross-sectional research designs.
5
The Regulatory Quality index measures a government’s ability to implement and formulate sound policies and
regulations (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home). See Section 1.3 for a more detailed
explanation.
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models, I find that, even after controlling for the enforcement environment, the source of the
deregistration effect appears to be driven by changes in the accounting environment.6 The use of
IFRS serves as a substitute for a U.S. cross-listing, enabling firms to maintain the same level of
accounting quality following deregistration from U.S. exchanges.7
While previous papers have tested the association between IFRS and accounting quality or
cross-listing and accounting quality, I exploit the unique setting of deregistration from the U.S. to
connect these streams of literature. First, deregistration provides a timely and interesting setting
to examine given the passing of Rule 12h-6, the concern as to the cost of deregistration for
investors and the growing trend in voluntary deregistrations as compared to new cross-listings in
recent years (SEC 2007b; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2010; Karolyi 2012). Second, this setting
allows me to separate two of the main drivers of cross-listing effects: U.S. disclosure requirements
and U.S. regulatory oversight to determine the source of the negative association between
deregistration and accounting quality. The setting also allows the analysis to be conducted using
the firm as its own control, as well as matching the deregistering firm to a non-deregistering firm
in the same year and country, to mitigate the effect of concurrent changes in home country
economies and institutions and focus on the impact of the firm’s release from the SEC’s
jurisdiction on its accounting quality (e.g. Gordon, Jorgensen, and Linthicum 2009).
While recent literature has argued that changes in enforcement rather than changes in
accounting standards drive capital market consequences, such as market liquidity, (e.g. Daske,
Hail, Leuz, and Verdi 2008; Christensen et al. 2013; Brown, Preiato, and Tarca 2014; Leuz and

6

The correlation coefficient between home markets that require IFRS and home markets with high regulatory quality
is 0.24. See Section 1.5 for an additional discussion of the correlation between these two variables.
7
The results are robust to additional analysis which shows the pre-deregistration accounting quality attributes of
deregistering firms are not significantly different compared to non-deregistering matched firms or between
deregistering IFRS and deregistering non-IFRS firms.

6

Wysocki 2015), the setting of my paper focuses on a different question and sample. First, this
paper addresses properties of accounting earnings and quality rather than capital market effects.
Second, I utilize deregistration from the U.S. and not mandatory IFRS adoption as my
experimental setting. Lastly, this paper does not analyze changes in home market institutions and
cross-country regulatory changes, but rather changes in financial reporting caused by leaving the
SEC’s jurisdiction, and whether these changes, if any, are associated with the level of disclosure
or enforcement in the home market.
The properties of accounting earnings examined in this paper have been used in prior
literature to capture both earnings management and financial reporting quality. The objective of
this paper is not to parse out or explicitly test whether changes in the properties of earnings around
deregistration is being driven by management manipulation or intrinsic quality. Instead, this paper
seeks to examine if the reporting of accounting earnings is influenced by deregistration from U.S.
exchanges. The separation of these two features of earnings is beyond the scope of this paper.
This paper extends recent literature on foreign firm deregistrations (Hostak, Lys, Yang,
and Carr 2013; Li 2014) by examining the impact of IFRS on international cross-listings (e.g.
Chen, Ng, and Tsang 2015). Chen et al. (2015) find that following the mandatory adoption of
IFRS firms from countries requiring IFRS financial statements are more likely to cross-list in other
countries requiring IFRS and less likely to cross-list in non-IFRS countries (e.g. the U.S). By
examining foreign firms’ deregistration rather than listing decisions, my results extend and support
the notion that the use of IFRS has impacted the market of cross-border listings as foreign firms
using IFRS maintain the same level of accounting quality in their home markets as when they were
listed on U.S. exchanges. As a result, this paper also adds to the literature on the effects of IFRS
adoption on global financial markets.

7

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section develops the
hypotheses. I then discuss the sample selection and research design in Section 1.3. I follow this
with the main results in Section 1.4 and a discussion of additional analyses in Section 1.5. Finally,
Section 1.6 concludes the paper.
1.2

Hypotheses Development
Doidge et al. (2004) find that firms from countries with poorer accounting standards 8 are

more likely to cross-list in the U.S. because, in doing so, firms can signal to the market that “their
accounting had been upgraded” (Coffee 2002, 1790). Coffee argues this change in the information
environment can be attributed to increased enforcement by the SEC and more stringent disclosure
requirements in financial reporting. Similarly, Leuz (2006) argues that the changes that follow
from a U.S. cross-listing are the result of a combination of legal and market forces. SEC disclosure
requirements, such as Form 20-F reconciliations, enable investors and analysts to inspect financial
information, which allows market forces to reduce the information asymmetry between minority
shareholders and insiders. Further, auditors of foreign firms face higher litigation risks in the U.S.
which can lead to higher audit effort (Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic 2009).9
This argued increase in oversight and enhanced disclosure has manifested itself in a higher
accounting quality for U.S. cross-listed firms compared to their matched non-cross-listed peers.
Cross-listed firms show less evidence of earnings smoothing, report fewer discretionary accruals,
have a lower tendency to manage earnings towards a target, and recognize losses in a timelier
manner than their non-cross-listed peers (Lang et al. 2003b). Corroborating these results, Lang,
Lins and Miller (2003a) provide evidence that analyst coverage and forecast accuracy increase

Their proxy for accounting standards was the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research’s 1991 index
of accounting standards.
9
Application of the law has shown that antifraud provisions in the 1934 Securities Act have transnational jurisdiction
and apply to non-U.S. auditors of cross-listed firms (Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn 2002).
8

8

around a U.S. cross-listing and firms’ improved information environments lead to higher
valuations. The association between improvements in accounting quality and cross-listing appear
to be specific to firms subject to SEC rules and disclosures (Level II and III ADRs) and not firms
cross-listed on the OTC or in other overseas markets (Lang et al. 2003b).10 If deregistration from
the U.S. releases a firm from the SEC’s jurisdiction, then a firm’s financial reporting environment
is expected to change. On the other hand, Lang et al. (2006) find that foreign firms cross-listed in
the U.S. exhibit more earnings smoothing, a greater tendency to manage earnings towards a target,
a lower association of earnings with share price, and less timely recognition of losses than U.S.
firms. They attribute this finding to the relatively high rate of noncompliance with disclosure
requirements and low rates of SEC disclosure enforcement for cross-listed firms (Frost and
Pownall 1994). Following these arguments, if a cross-listed firm is not subject to stringent SEC
disclosure and enforcement, then deregistration from the U.S. is not expected to significantly
change a firm’s financial reporting environment.
Given these arguments as to the relationship between deregistration and accounting quality,
I state my first hypothesis in null form:
Hypothesis 1: There is no association between deregistration and accounting quality.
Testing this hypothesis enables me to determine the main effect, if any, of deregistration
on accounting quality. An issue with analyzing only the main effect is that it does not allow
determination of the source of the deregistration effect. Leuz (2003a) argues that prior research

10

Foreign issuers listed in the U.S. are classified into four categories and subject to varying degrees of SEC regulation.
Level II American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are listed on major U.S. securities exchanges (NYSE, AMEX,
NASDAQ), but do not involve raising new capital. Level III ADRs involve a public offering of securities in the U.S.
to raise capital and are listed on major U.S. exchanges. Both Level II and III ADRs must comply with the full
registration and reporting requirements of the 1934 Exchange Act and SEC rules. Level I (OTC) and SEC Rule 144a
private placements are not subject to the full reporting requirements of the 1934 Exchange Act and disclosure is limited
to only that required by the firm’s home market (http://www.adrbnymellon.com/). In this paper, I focus only on Level
II and III ADRs.
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has focused on the main or average effect of cross-listing rather than potentially more interesting
interactive effects of institutional variables or firm characteristics, which are important for
analyzing cross-listing effects in cross-sectional research designs. The conclusions I can draw
from this analysis are made more robust by disentangling the relationship between accounting
quality and deregistration to determine if the deregistration effects are associated with leaving the
U.S. disclosure environment or leaving the U.S. regulatory environment (Bailey, Karolyi, and
Salva 2006; Leuz 2003a).
The link between cross-listing and accounting disclosure has been examined in prior
literature. By comparing Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. with other cross-listed firms, Leuz
(2003a) concludes that improvements in forecast accuracy following a U.S. cross-listing can be
attributed to increased disclosure requirements, as only those firms from countries with lower
disclosure quality than the U.S. (i.e. non-Canadian firms) experienced improvements in forecast
accuracy. Bailey et al. (2006) find that even after controlling for the differences in the level of
investor protection between the U.S. and foreign firms’ home markets, cross-listed firms from
countries with better accounting standards experience a more significant increase in volatility
reactions around earnings announcements.
Since 1980 the SEC has required foreign firms to reconcile their financial statements to
U.S. GAAP because “investors’ need for the same type of basic information implies that foreign
and domestic registrants should be subject to the same disclosure requirements” (SEC 2007c, 12).11
This reconciliation is aimed at helping investors understand foreign investment opportunities
“more clearly and with greater comparability than if those issuers disclosed their financial results

Before 1980, SEC guidance with respect to financial statements of foreign issuers required only that the “accounting
principles used by foreign private issuers have authoritative support”. Annual reports required only a narrative
description of the differences between foreign accounting principles and U.S. GAAP (SEC 2007c, 11).
11

10

under a multiplicity of national accounting standards” (SEC 2007c, 25). However, in the decades
since the reconciliation requirements were first established, the global accounting landscape has
significantly changed with the growing use and acceptance of IFRS worldwide.
Adoption of IFRS has been argued as a mechanism to improve accounting quality because
it eliminates certain accounting options that were possible under domestic standards, thereby
reducing managerial discretion (Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008). This has increased investors’
ability to compare firms across jurisdictions. These comparability improvements exist even for
firms with domestic accounting standards similar to IFRS (e.g. the U.K) and firms with high
information quality before adoption (Brochet, Jagolinzer, and Riedl 2013).

Comparability

improvements are attributable to both accounting convergence and higher quality information (Yip
and Young 2012). Thus, not only does IFRS improve financial reporting quality, but the associated
enhanced cross-market comparability potentially raises the cost of manipulating earnings for IFRS
firms.
Kim, Li, and Li (2012) find that U.S. investors do not perceive cross-listed firms’ IFRSbased accounting information to be of lower quality relative to that based on U.S. GAAP. Barth,
Landsman, Lang, and Williams (2012) find compared to when they applied non-U.S. domestic
standards, firms’ accounting numbers were more comparable to those of U.S. firms after
application of IFRS. Leuz (2003b) and Bartov, Goldberg, and Kim (2005) conclude that U.S.
GAAP and IFRS provide similar information quality and value relevance for German firms.
The SEC, recognizing the global growth of IFRS and its comparable high-quality with U.S.
GAAP, enacted an amendment in 2007 allowing the acceptance of IFRS-prepared financial
statements in SEC filings without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP for cross-listed firms. In the
arguments for the final ruling, the SEC stated:

11

“In general, commenters supporting the proposal, which included many foreign private
issuers, accounting firms, legal firms and foreign standard setters, as well as some
investors, agreed that IFRS were suitable to be used as an internationally accepted set of
standards…We believe, based on the staff’s review of IFRS financial statements, that
financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS as issued by the IASB are of
sufficient quality” (SEC 2007a).
The acceptance of IFRS-based financial statements in the U.S. shows the belief among regulators,
standard setters, and investors of the high-quality these financial statements provide. Norsk
Hydro’s deregistration announcement cited in the introduction corroborates these arguments as the
firm believes its home accounting environment will continue to provide investors with high quality
financial reporting due to the mandated use of IFRS. If accounting standards and disclosure are a
source of deregistration effects and IFRS provides comparable quality, then deregistration from
the U.S. and a return to an IFRS-market is not expected to significantly change a firm’s financial
reporting quality.
On the other hand, some studies have argued that there is a negative association between
IFRS and accounting quality. Ahmed, Neel, and Wang (2013) find that accounting quality
decreased after mandatory IFRS adoption, as captured by greater income smoothing, an increase
in aggressive reporting of accruals, and a decrease in the timely recognition of losses. Atwood,
Drake, Myers, and Myers (2011) find that, while IFRS and U.S. GAAP are both high quality
standards, U.S. GAAP is better with predicting future cash flows. Callao and Jarne (2010) find
that earnings management has increased in the EU following IFRS adoption, which they argue is
due to the flexibility the new standards provide to managers compared to domestic standards. If
accounting standards and disclosure are a source of deregistration effects, but IFRS does not
provide comparable quality, then it is uncertain if the use of IFRS is associated with the
relationship between deregistration and accounting quality. Additionally, prior literature has found
some evidence that the improvements in accounting quality from a U.S. cross-listing are not being
12

driven by those firms reporting under IAS or U.S. GAAP, and thus, accounting standards per se
may not play a role in accounting quality changes around cross-listing (Lang et al. 2003b).12 Thus,
it is not certain whether home market accounting standards and disclosure contribute to
deregistration effects.
Given the conflicting evidence from prior literature on the impact of IFRS on accounting
quality as well as the uncertainty whether accounting standards and disclosure drive deregistration
effects, it is not clear if accounting standards will impact the relationship between accounting
quality and deregistration. I state my next hypothesis in null form:
Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between accounting quality and deregistration is not
associated with the use of IFRS.
The link between increased regulatory quality in the U.S. and cross-listing effects has been
examined in prior literature. Hail and Leuz (2009) find that firms cross-listed in the U.S.
experience a significant decrease in their cost of capital, however, this reduction is smaller for
firms from countries with stronger legal institutions. Leuz (2003a) finds that U.S. legal liability
and SEC enforcement, rather than U.S. disclosure requirements, are the source of cross-listing
effects for improved analyst coverage of cross-listed firms. Doidge et al. (2004) find that the crosslisting premium, as proxied by Tobin’s Q, is larger for firms from countries with weaker legal
enforcement.
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) discuss the importance of the link
between a country’s financial accounting environment and its effect on investor protection and
enforcement of investors’ rights. Barth et al. (2008) argue that increases in accounting quality
could follow from a change in accounting standards because of contemporaneous changes in the

Lang et al.’s sample period ends in 2001, however, and the early literature on IAS has shown that IAS standards
have increased in quality over time (Leuz and Verrechia 2000; Holthausen 2003).
12
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financial reporting system, such as more stringent enforcement, which limit manager’s discretion
to opportunistically manage earnings. Leuz (2006) points out that while cross-listed firms follow
the same or similar accounting standards as U.S. firms they are still subject to different institutional
forces in their home markets. This supports the findings in Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) that
institutional factors influence accounting quality. If regulation is the source of the association
between deregistration and accounting quality, then it is expected that firms from countries with
weaker enforcement environments compared to the U.S. will exhibit larger decreases in accounting
quality following deregistration, while firms from countries with comparable enforcement
environments will exhibit no significant changes.
On the other hand, some literature has argued that the link between increased enforcement
and cross-listing is weak given the relatively little oversight and enforcement by the SEC of crosslisted firms (Siegel 2005). Cheng, Srinivasan, and Yu (2014) find that the litigation rate against
foreign cross-listed firms is significantly lower than that of a matched U.S. sample with similar
ex-ante litigation risk. They conclude, therefore, that the threat of lawsuits does not restrain
corporate misreporting for foreign firms as strongly as it does for U.S. firms.

Similarly,

Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu (2015) find that the lower number of restatements for cross-listed firms
compared to U.S. firms is attributable to less stringent monitoring. If the enforcement of crosslisted firms in the U.S. is weak, then it is it is not certain whether the level of regulatory quality is
associated with the relationship between deregistration and accounting quality.
Given the conflicting evidence from prior literature on the uncertainty whether
enforcement drives cross-listing effects, it is not clear whether regulatory quality will impact the
relationship between accounting quality and deregistration. I state my final hypothesis in null
form:
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Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between accounting quality and deregistration is not
associated with regulatory quality.
1.3

Sample Selection and Research Design
Table 1.1 details the sample composition. Due to changes in form filing requirements

during my sample period, I utilize two sources to obtain foreign firm deregistrations. Following
the enactment of Rule 12h-6 in March 2007, all foreign firm deregistrations are filed under SEC
Form 15F, as opposed to the earlier SEC Form 15 which contained both foreign and domestic
deregistrations. Using the Edgar Online I-Metrix database, I collect involuntary and voluntary
Form 15Fs filed from March 2007 through December 2012. To collect deregistrations from 2004
through February 2007 and ensure complete coverage in the Edgar Online I-Metrix database for
the latter sample period, I utilize the online ADR directories of Bank of New York, Citibank, and
JP Morgan to obtain all voluntary and involuntary foreign firm deregistrations throughout the
sample period.13 Involuntary deregistration refers to the removal of a firm from a U.S. exchange
because of a merger and acquisition, bankruptcy, or violation of listing requirements. The reason
for firms’ deregistration is stated either in SEC filings or in an accompanying press release which
allows me to more clearly distinguish involuntary from voluntary deregistrations.
The sample period starts in 2004 given wide-spread mandatory adoption of IFRS began in
2005; ending the sample in 2012 allows me to collect two years of post-deregistration data. The
sample is further restricted to ensure only Level II and Level III foreign firm ADRs are included
as only these types of firms are subject to periodic SEC filings such as the Form 20-F reconciliation
and I focus only on firms deregistering equity securities. After eliminating firms without sufficient
data in Worldscope and financial firms, the sample consists of 135 voluntary foreign

13

See adrbnymellon.com, citiadr.idmanagedsolutions.com, and adr.com, respectively.
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deregistrations. Finally, because Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. are not classified as
“ADRs” and are exempt from the U.S. reporting requirements required of other cross-listed firms,
consistent with prior literature, Canadian firms are eliminated from the sample.
The final sample consists of 122 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from 2004 through
2012. These deregistering firms were cross-listed in the U.S. for an average of 11 years, with 82%
of the sample coming to the U.S. before 2001, the year the IASB was founded (untabulated). The
United Kingdom (U.K.), France, and Germany represent the highest number of deregistering firms.
When examining the breakdown of deregistering firms by year and country, the sample
composition is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Marosi and Massoud 2008; Doidge et al. 2010;
Hostak et al. 2013).
This study examines three measures of accounting quality: abnormal accruals, loss
avoidance, and timely loss recognition. Following prior literature, earnings are considered of
higher quality if accruals are lower, the probability of reporting a loss is greater, and reporting of
losses is more timely (e.g. Basu 1997; Jones 1991; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Dechow et al.
2010). Leuz (2006) asserts that in order to isolate the effect of cross-listing future research must
compare the same firm before cross-listing or similar firms in the same country without crosslistings. Deregistration from the U.S. provides an interesting setting because it allows me to
conduct multiple levels of analysis.
First, by comparing accounting quality in the pre- and post-deregistration periods for
deregistering firms only, I use each firm as its own control, allowing me to focus on changes in
accounting quality, while controlling for other time-invariant firm and country characteristics.
Second, I compare accounting quality for deregistering firms to a matched group of nonderegistering cross-listed firms in the post-deregistration period. Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006)
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argue that cross-listed firms are still subject to home country institutions and markets in addition
to the U.S. environment. Matching deregistering firms with non-deregistering firms on country,
year, industry and size14 controls for any concurrent changes in home country institutions and
economic activities that may confound the results, and as a result isolates the effect of
deregistration from the U.S. Additionally, the matched sample models continue to include country,
year, and industry fixed effects to capture various differences across countries, time, and industries.
All tests described below are conducted for both the sample of deregistering firms only and the
matched sample. I collect data from 2001 through 2014 to ensure there are enough firm-year
observations before and after deregistration to capture the effect of deregistration on accounting
quality. Additionally, as the event centers on the year of deregistration, I remove this year from
my analysis.
To test hypothesis one, I run all models described below using an indicator variable for
whether the firm-year observation occurs in the post-deregistration period (PostDereg). This
allows me to examine the association between deregistration and accounting quality in general.
As I am interested in determining the source of the deregistration effect, if any, I next address the
arguments set forth in Leuz (2003a) and Bailey et al. (2006) of the importance of including
interactions in cross-listing research designs.15, 16 In doing so, I test if the relationship between
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I use LnSales to proxy for firm size. Matching on Sales Growth produces statistically similar results (untabulated).
Leuz (2003a), in discussing and replicating the results of Lang et al. (2003a), sets up a test for cross-listing effects
on analyst coverage and analyst forecast accuracy using Canadian firms. He argues that since the Multijurisdictional
Disclosure System exempts Canadian firms from U.S. reporting requirements this can be interpreted as disclosure
requirements being comparable between the U.S. and Canada. However, since SEC enforcement and legal liability
is more stringent in the U.S., Leuz argues that he can hold disclosure requirements constant in order to isolate the
effects of U.S. legal liability and SEC enforcement on cross-listed firms. If extensive disclosure requirements drive
cross-listing effects, then Canadian firms should experience no changes around U.S. cross-listings. On the other hand,
if SEC enforcement and U.S. legal liability drive changes, then even Canadian firms will experience significant crosslisting effects. Leuz finds that Canadian firms experience no change in forecast accuracy, and thus, the cross-listing
effect can be attributed to changes in disclosure. Conversely, Canadian firms experience a significant increase in
analyst following leading Leuz to conclude that the source of cross-listing effects differs for following versus accuracy.
16
Bailey et al. (2006) examine changes in market reactions to earnings announcements around U.S. cross-listings to
see if there is an association with increased disclosure. The authors recognize that their findings could falsely be
15
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deregistration and accounting quality, if any, can be explained by firms’ home market accounting
environments or firms’ home market regulatory environments.
To test hypothesis 2a, I use an indicator variable that captures firms returning to IFRS
accounting environments (IFRS) and interact it with post-deregistration firm-year observations
(PostDereg) to examine if the use of IFRS is associated with the relationship, if any, between
accounting quality and deregistration. To test hypothesis 2b, I use an indicator variable that
captures the regulatory quality of firms’ home markets (RegQual) and interact it with postderegistration firm-year observations (PostDereg) to examine if regulatory quality in the home
market is associated with the relationship, if any, between accounting quality and deregistration.
To measure regulatory quality, I obtain the Regulatory Quality index from the World
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, a dataset produced by Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2013) covering the time periods and countries in my sample. This specific index has
been used extensively in prior literature (e.g. Christensen et al. 2013; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz
2007; Yu and Wahid 2014; Wang 2014). A key feature of the dataset and methodology is that it
includes a margin of error for each country’s yearly estimate, which the authors argue needs to be
taken into account when making comparisons across countries. I utilize the U.S. as the benchmark
and classify any country-year with an upper-bound percentile rank greater or equal to the U.S.’s
upper-bound rank (higher ranks indicating greater levels of regulatory quality) as having
comparable regulatory quality. As such, I set values of RegQual equal to 1 for these country-year
observations and 0 otherwise.

associated with increased disclosure when, in fact, it is increased investor protection stemming from U.S. laws and
enforcement that is driving the results. In their tests, the authors attempt to disentangle the two effects by separately
interacting their proxies for accounting standards and enforcement with an indicator variable for post-cross-listing
years.
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1.3.1 Abnormal Accruals and Loss Avoidance
The first measure of accounting quality is abnormal accruals. Firms have higher earnings
quality when abnormal accruals are smaller. I follow Francis et al. (2013) to calculate accruals for
an international sample. First, I calculate total accruals (Total_Acc) in year t as earnings before
extraordinary items less operating cash flows, scaled by total assets in year t-1. To calculate
abnormal accruals (Abn_Accruals), I use the modified Jones (1991) model controlling for
concurrent firm performance (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley
2005). Abnormal accruals are the firm-specific residuals from the model of expected accruals;
higher accounting quality results in smaller abnormal accruals.17
The next proxy looks at the likelihood of reporting a loss. Prior literature has argued that
firms avoid losses by managing earnings. This has been highlighted in the “kink” in benchmark
distributions in which a higher proportion of firms report small profits than small losses
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). It is expected that lower accounting quality is associated with a
higher likelihood of loss avoidance (i.e. reporting more profits). This is measured using an
indicator variable (Loss) that takes the value of 1 if the firm reports negative income before
extraordinary items in year t and 0 otherwise.
The following model is used to test the association between deregistration and accounting
quality for these two proxies:18
Abn_Accruals or Prob(Loss) = β0 + β1PostDereg + δControls +
Following Francis et al. (2013) I also measure abnormal accruals using Francis and Wang (2008)’s adaption of the
linear expectation model from DeFond and Park (2001). Francis and Wang (2008) argue that using the cross-sectional
Jones (1991) model on an international data set can prove problematic given the potential small number of
observations. Assuming accruals have a constant linear relationship over time with sales and gross PPE, the model
calculates a firm’s expected accruals in year t based on the ratios of current accruals to sales and depreciation expense
to PPE in year t-1. Abnormal accruals are then calculated as the firm’s actual total accruals in year t less predicted
accruals in year t. My results (untabulated) are robust to this alternative measure.
18
The research design discussed in this section, and the results presented in the following section, are robust to using
the absolute value of abnormal accruals or total accruals as the dependent variable (untabulated).
17
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Fixed or Random Effects + e

(1).

The main variable of interest is PostDereg, an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for all
firm-year observations in the periods following deregistration from the U.S. and 0 otherwise. This
model is run on a sample that includes only deregistering firms and a matched model of
deregistering and non-deregistering firms.
After first examining hypothesis 1, whether there is an association between deregistration
and accounting, I then test whether this association is influenced by features of the home market,
namely the type of accounting standards used by the firm (hypothesis 2a) or the enforcement
environment (hypothesis 2b). Equation (1) is expanded as follows:
Abn_Accruals or Prob(Loss) = β0 + β1PostDereg + β2IFRS + β3PostDereg*IFRS + δControls +
Fixed or Random Effects + e

(2a).

Abn_Accruals or Prob(Loss) = β0 + β1PostDereg + β2RegQual + β3PostDereg*RegQual +
δControls + Fixed or Random Effects + e

(2b).

Lastly, I combine models (2a) and (2b) to simultaneously control for both changes in disclosure
and changes in enforcement, following the model in Bailey et al. (2006).
All models include control variables from prior literature that may affect the level of
abnormal accruals or the likelihood of reporting a loss and are associated with firms’ voluntary
accounting decisions (Barth et al. 2008). To control for company size I include the natural
logarithm of sales (LnSales). As operating cash flows are associated with the magnitude of
discretionary accruals (Dechow et al. 1995), I include cash flows from operations scaled by lagged
total assets (CFO). Given firms with higher levels of debt may have more incentive to engage in
earnings management activities to avoid covenant violations I include a control for leverage
(Leverage). Prior literature has also found that firms that have already reported losses have fewer
incentives to manage earnings than firms that report positive earnings (Francis and Yu 2009).
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Alternatively, the likelihood that a firm reports a loss is expected to increase given they have
reported a loss in the prior year. As such, I include an indicator variable that takes the value of 1
for firms with negative earnings in year t-1 (Lag_Loss) and 0 otherwise. To control for market
incentives to manage earnings I use the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book). While this
captures market based growth, I also include two additional growth measures, Sales_Growth and
PPE_Growth, both measured as growth from the prior year. Lastly, when the dependent variable
is Abn_Accruals I include country, year and industry fixed effects to control for omitted variables
that could affect firm-level accruals.19 A probit model is run when the dependent variable is Loss,
and as such I include random effects as opposed to fixed effects to control for omitted variables.
1.3.2 Timely Loss Recognition
The final measure of accounting quality captures the extent to which losses are
incorporated into earnings. Prior literature finds that timely loss recognition increases for firms
after cross-listing in the U.S. (Lang et al. 2003b; Huijgen and Lubberink 2005). Holthausen (2003)
argues the traditional Basu (1997) conservatism model is problematic in cross-country studies as
stock returns may not capture economic income consistently across countries. Given this issue, I
follow the model that maps cash flows into accruals from Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) as adapted by Francis et al. (2013). This approach measures the
timeliness with which accruals are recognized for those firms with negative relative to positive
cash flows, with negative cash flows serving as the proxy for economic losses.

Ball and

Shivakumar (2005) argue that timely gain and loss recognition is accomplished through accruals
as it is based on expected and not realized cash flows. The following OLS model is run:
Total_Accruals = β0 + β1PostDereg + β2Neg + β3CFO + β4Neg*PostDereg +

19

I conducted a Hausman (1978) specification test to determine whether to use a random effects or fixed effects model.
The results, not reported, show that the fixed effects model is a more appropriate estimator.
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β5CFO*PostDereg + β6Neg*CFO + β7Neg*CFO*PostDereg + δControls + e

(3),

where Neg is an indicator variable that equals 1 if cash flows from operations in year t are negative
and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of interest is the three-way interaction between Neg, CFO, and
PostDereg. Firms with negative cash flows are expected to have more timely recognition of
accruals relative to firms with positive cash flows, signaling higher accounting quality. Including
the three-way interaction term captures the extent to which the relation between timely recognition
of accruals for negative cash flow firms is affected by deregistration. A negative coefficient
indicates less timely recognition and hence, lower accounting quality (Francis et al. 2013).
Included in this model are controls for size, leverage, and market-to-book which are
associated with accounting conservatism. Each control variable is interacted with Neg and CFO
separately and in a three-way interaction. Country, year, and industry fixed effects are also
included in the models. As in the other models, I am interested in incorporating an IFRS indicator
variable and a regulatory quality indicator variable to parse out the source of changes in accounting
quality following deregistration. Given the complications of interpreting four-way interactions, I
instead re-run equation (3) on a sample of firms in which IFRS is equal to one and on a sample of
firms in which RegQual is equal to one. If the use of IFRS mitigates the change in accounting
quality following deregistration, then I expect to find a positive coefficient on the three-way
interaction term, Neg*CFO*PostDereg, for this subsample. If a high regulatory quality home
market mitigates the change in accounting quality following deregistration, then I expect to find a
positive coefficient on the three-way interaction term, Neg*CFO*PostDereg, for the other
subsample. Similar to the earlier tests, I analyze the timely loss recognition measure for a sample
of deregistering firms only and a sample including matched non-deregistering firms.
1.4

Results
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Table 1.2 Panel A presents a univariate analysis of deregistering firms before and after
deregistration. As deregistrations can occur at any point in the fiscal year I remove the year of
deregistration from the analysis. The number of firm-year observations in which financial
statements are prepared under IFRS increases in the post-deregistration period, consistent with
time trends in IFRS adoption. The RegQuality also increases over the sample period under study,
which is consistent with concurrent improvements in accounting standards and regulation
(Christensen et al. 2013). There is no significant change in deregistering firms’ sales, cash flows
from operations, or leverage. Deregistering firms have significantly smaller growth in the postderegistration period, as proxied by Sales Growth and PPE Growth. They also report losses less
frequently in the post-deregistration period, consistent with lower accounting quality. Similarly,
deregistering firms have higher abnormal accruals in the years after deregistration from U.S.
exchanges, indicating potentially lower accounting quality. Overall, there appear to be no
significant changes in firms’ operations between the two time-periods that could be driving
changes in accounting quality.
Table 1.2 Panel B presents a univariate analysis of deregistering firms after deregistration
compared to a matched sample of firms that maintain their cross-listing on U.S. exchanges.20 As
the samples are matched on country and year, there are no significant differences in the type of
accounting standards used or the home market regulatory quality. Similarly, as the firms are
matched on size and industry, there are no significant differences in most of the firm characteristics
between the two subsamples. Non-deregistering firms report losses more frequently, consistent

20

I match first on country and year. To the extent that an exact industry match (2-digit SIC) is not available, which is
the case for 12 deregistering firm observations, I match the deregistering firm to the two nearest country-year firms in
terms of size. Because of this specification, there exist a greater number of firm-year observations for the control
sample in Table 1.2 Panel B. The results are robust to excluding those firms without an exact country-year-industry
match. Additionally, the models include industry-level controls to alleviate any issues with not having an exact
industry match.

23

with lower accounting quality for deregistering firms. Similarly, deregistering firms have higher
abnormal accruals, indicating potentially lower accounting quality. Overall, the two subsamples
appear to be balanced allowing me to test the association between deregistration and accounting
quality.
1.4.1 Abnormal Accruals
I next turn to multivariate tests of accounting quality and deregistration. The results from
running a cross-sectional regression of abnormal accruals on the sample of deregistering firms
only and the matched sample are displayed in Table 1.3 Panels A and B, respectively. The results
for testing hypothesis 1 are displayed in the first column (model 1). This model contains the
indicator variable PostDereg to capture firm-year observations in the years after deregistration.
This variable is positive and significant in both Panel A and Panel B. Firms deregistering from
the U.S. experience an approximately 0.9% increase in abnormal accruals in the years after
deregistration compared to both before the firm deregistered and to a sample of firms that maintain
their U.S. cross-listing.
Turning to the source of this positive association between deregistration and abnormal
accruals (negative association between deregistration and accounting quality), model 2a in Panels
A and B introduces the IFRS variable and interaction term to test hypothesis 2a. This model also
controls for the regulatory quality of the home market (RegQuality).

While the indicator

PostDereg continues to be positive and significant in both Panel A and B, the interaction term
PostDereg*IFRS is negative and significant. An F-test of the sum of the coefficients on PostDereg
and PostDereg*IFRS (0.006 in both Panels) shows that I cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum
of the coefficients equals zero. Thus, IFRS firms experience no significant change in abnormal
accruals following deregistration and the increase in abnormal accruals is attributable to those
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firms returning to non-IFRS home markets. While abnormal accruals are higher for deregistering
firm-years, this relationship is mitigated by high-quality accounting in the home market.
To examine the other potential source of deregistration effects (hypothesis 2b), in model
2b I interact RegQuality with PostDereg which captures firms returning to a regulatory
environment comparable to the U.S. while also controlling for the use of IFRS. In both Panels A
and B I find that the interaction with RegQuality is not significant. Thus, the regulatory quality in
the home market is not associated with the relationship between deregistration and abnormal
accruals.
Finally, I combine models 2a and 2b to control for both the accounting environment and
regulatory environment in the home market post-deregistration (model 3). In model 3 in Panels A
and B, I continue to find a positive association between abnormal accruals and deregistration. Both
panels also show this positive association is mitigated by the use of IFRS. The sum of PostDereg
and PostDereg*IFRS in both panels (0.002 and 0.004, respectively) is not significantly different
from zero, showing that IFRS firms experience no significant change in the level of abnormal
accruals

around

deregistration

from

the

U.S.

The

insignificant

coefficient

on

PostDereg*RegQuality in both panels shows that the source of the deregistration effect appears to
be a change in the accounting and disclosure environments for cross-listed firms. In addition, the
signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the control variables remain the same across all four
specifications and both panels. Larger firms tend to have larger abnormal accruals, while CFO,
Leverage, and Lag Loss are all negatively associated with abnormal accruals.
1.4.2 Loss Avoidance
The next proxy for accounting quality is the probability of reporting a loss. Table 1.4
Panels A and B presents the results for a probit model analyzing the sample of deregistering firms
only and matched non-deregistering firms, respectively. The model specifications are the same as
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in the accruals analysis. Model 1 tests hypothesis 1 by examining the association between the
probability of reporting a loss and deregistration from the U.S. In both panels, I find that
deregistering firms are significantly less likely to report losses compared to both before
deregistration and to non-deregistering firms.
In model 2a, the coefficient on PostDereg*IFRS is positive and significant in both panels.
In Panel A and B, a Wald test shows the sum of the coefficients on PostDereg and PostDereg*IFRS
(-0.229 and 0.027, respectively) is insignificantly different from zero. While deregistration
decreases the probability that a non-IFRS firm will report a loss, it results in no significant change
for IFRS firms. In model 2b, I test hypothesis 2b to determine if the source of the negative
association between deregistration and accounting quality is mitigated by the high regulatory
quality in the home market. I find insignificant results in both panels, indicating that the
relationship between deregistration and accounting quality is not associated with the regulatory
quality of the home market.
Model 3 combines both models 2a and 2b and the results continue to show that even after
controlling for differences in the regulatory environments between the U.S. and home markets,
differences in accounting standards remains a significant factor in explaining changes in
accounting quality for deregistering firms. Again, a Wald test shows the sum of the coefficients
on PostDereg and PostDereg*IFRS (-0.082 and -0.228, respectively) is insignificantly different
from zero. Additionally, across both panels and all specifications, the probability of reporting a
loss is less likely for larger firms (LnSales) and firms with higher cash flows from operations
(CFO). Consistent with prior literature, the probability of reporting a loss is higher for firms with
higher leverage (Leverage) and those with prior period losses (Lag_Loss).
1.4.3 Timely Loss Recognition
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The final accounting quality proxy examined is timely loss recognition. As discussed in
Section 1.3, my interest in this analysis is the coefficient on the interaction term
Neg*CFO*PostDereg which captures the timeliness of recording total accruals for firms with
negative cash flows following deregistration from the U.S. (Francis et al. 2013). Table 1.5 Panel
A and B details the analysis for the sample of deregistering firms only and the sample of
deregistering firms and matched non-deregistering firms, respectively. Model 1 is run on the full
samples in each setting. The results show a negative and significant coefficient on the three-way
interaction term in both panels, which indicates total accruals are recorded in a less timely manner
for firms with negative cash flows in post-deregistration years compared to pre-deregistration
years and their matched non-deregistering peers. Thus, accounting quality is lower following
deregistration.
As in the earlier tests, I am interested in determining the source of the negative association
between deregistration and accounting quality.

However, rather than including four-way

interactions in the model with not only the variables of interest, but also all control variables, I
instead re-run model 1 on a subsample of firms that use IFRS. In doing so, I test if IFRS mitigates
the negative relationship between deregistration and accounting quality (hypothesis 2a). model 2a
in both panels shows that for IFRS firms only, the interaction term Neg*CFO*PostDereg is now
significantly positive, which provides evidence that accruals are recorded more timely for
deregistering firms with negative cash flows that use IFRS and thus, the source of the deregistration
effect appears to be a change in firms’ accounting environments following deregistration from the
U.S.
The final model in the panels re-runs model 1 on the subsample of firms with high
regulatory quality home markets (RegQuality equal to one) to test hypothesis 2b. The coefficient
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on the interaction term is negative and insignificant in both panels, indicating that home market
regulatory quality does not impact the association between deregistration and timely recognition.
Overall, the three models in Panel A show that accounting quality is lower for deregistering firms
after leaving U.S markets, but this negative association is mitigated by the use of IFRS in firms’
home markets.
To summarize my main results, I find that there is a significant decrease in accounting
quality after deregistration from the U.S. Deregistering firms have higher abnormal accruals, are
less likely to report a loss, and have less timely recognition of accruals when cash flows are
negative, compared to before the firm deregistered and to a matched group of non-deregistering
firms. Further, when controlling for the home market accounting environment, I find this decrease
in accounting quality is not significant for firms returning to home markets that require IFRS, but
rather the significant decrease is attributable only to foreign firms returning to non-IFRS
environments. On the other hand, when controlling for the regulatory environment in the home
market, I find the negative association between deregistration and accounting quality is not
mitigated by home markets with higher regulatory quality. When including both interactions in
the same model, I find that even after controlling for the enforcement environment the source of
deregistration effects appears to be driven by changes in accounting standards.
1.5

Additional Analyses
To ensure the results presented thus far are not influenced by the measures of accounting

quality selected, I conduct additional tests using alternative proxies. Following prior literature, I
use two measures of earnings smoothing (e.g. Leuz et al. 2003; Lang et al. 2003b; Lang et al. 2006;
Barth et al. 2008). The first captures the extent insiders reduce the variability of reported earnings
by manipulating accruals in order to conceal changes in a firm’s performance. It is measured as
the ratio of the standard-deviation of operating earnings divided by the standard deviation of cash
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flow from operations; lower values of this ratio indicate insiders use accounting discretion to
smooth reported earnings (Leuz et al. 2003). The second captures the extent to which insiders use
accruals to hide economic shocks to a firm’s operating cash flow. It is measured as the correlation
between changes in accruals and operating cash flows. Larger negative correlations indicate a
smoothing of earnings that does not reflect a firm’s underlying economic performance (Leuz et al.
2003).
Table 1.6 and 1.7 present the results of these measures for the sample of deregistering firms
only and matched deregistering and non-deregistering firms, respectively. Panel A in both tables
compares the full samples under study, without separating by IFRS or RegQual. Both tables show
the negative relationship between deregistration and accounting quality persists using these
proxies. The significantly lower variability of earnings relative to cash flows and the significantly
larger negative correlation between changes in accruals and cash flows shows a higher tendency
to smooth reported earnings for deregistering firms.
Panels B and C in both tables split the sample by the main variables of interest from the
tests of hypothesis 2a and 2b. Table 1.6 illustrates that non-IFRS firms show significantly
smoother earnings following deregistration than IFRS firms, while there is no significant
difference between the two groups before deregistration. Table 1.7 Panel B corroborates this
finding that non-IFRS deregistering firms show significantly more earnings smoothing after
deregistration than matched non-deregistering firms. Both tables show that splitting the sample
on RegQual results in no significant changes for firms following deregistration. Thus, the
alternative accounting quality proxies in these tables confirm the earlier reported results.
Another concern with this research design is that deregistering firms may exhibit
differences in accounting quality in the post-deregistration period compared to non-deregistering
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firms because their accounting quality in the pre-deregistration period is also different. Similarly,
the results for the differences in accounting quality for IFRS compared to non-IFRS users may be
driven by pre-deregistration differences. In order to attribute post-deregistration differences in
accounting quality to deregistration from the U.S. and changes in financial reporting for non-IFRS
firms, I need to compare pre-deregistration accounting quality. Finding that accounting quality is
similar for deregistering and non-deregistering firms and IFRS and non-IFRS deregistering firms
in the pre-deregistration period, but not in the post-deregistration period would make it less likely
that differences in accounting quality following deregistration are attributable to differences in
economic characteristics between the groups (Barth et al. 2008).
To test this, I examine accounting quality using only pre-deregistration firm-year
observations. In untabulated results, I find no significant relationship between IFRS or RegQuality
and accounting quality in the pre-deregistration period. My main test results thus appear to pick
up the effects of deregistration from the U.S. and not underlying differences in deregistering firms’
financial reporting characteristics before and after deregistration. Additionally, I compare
(untabulated) the accounting quality of the deregistering firms and their matched peers in the prederegistration period only and find that there is no significant difference in the accounting quality
for deregistering firms before deregistration compared to a matched group of non-deregistering
firms. This analysis allows to me conclude that differences in accounting quality between
deregistering firms and non-deregistering firms before deregistration from the U.S. does not
account for the post-deregistration difference supporting the results of my main analysis.
Another concern is that there is a fundamental difference in the types of firms that
deregistered before and after Rule 12h-6. Though the rule only changed the requirements to be
met for deregistration and not the type of firms that could deregister, it is possible my results are
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influenced by the time period under study. I repeat the procedures described in the previous section
on two separate subsamples of firms that deregistered before and after the March 2007 ruling, as
well as by including an indicator variable in the full sample tests for whether the firm deregistered
in the post-Rule12h-6 period. Under both sets of analysis (untabulated), I find no significant
change in the earlier reported results regardless of the separate time periods under study.
Deregistration from the U.S. continues to be associated with a decrease in accounting quality;
however, the use of IFRS in the home market (and not regulatory quality) mitigates this
relationship.
Lastly, it remains a methodological issue whether countries simultaneously adopt IFRS
and improve regulatory quality. I separate the two effects by examining changes in a country’s
Regulatory Quality Index around the mandatory IFRS adoption year, if applicable. I find that on
average, the Regulatory Quality Index decreases 0.02 points in the year following IFRS adoption
(the Index ranges from -2.5 [weak] to 2.5 [strong] governance). In terms of my indicator variable
classification (as described above), I find that one country (Chile) experienced a decrease in
regulatory quality compared to the U.S. in the year following mandatory IFRS adoption
(RegQuality changed from 1 to 0), while there were no other changes in classification for the
remaining countries. This analysis shows that the two variables capture different dimensions of
the home market.
1.6

Conclusion
Given SEC regulations loosening the requirements for foreign firms to leave the U.S. and

the subsequent spike in deregistrations, in this paper I analyze 122 foreign firms that voluntarily
deregistered from the U.S. from 2004 through 2012. Prior literature has attributed cross-listing
effects such as increased accounting quality, analyst following, accuracy, valuation, etc. to the
increased accounting disclosure environment in the U.S., as well as the increased regulatory
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enforcement. Addressing the arguments in prior literature as to the importance of separating these
effects, I study the association between deregistration and accounting quality and test whether
foreign firms’ home market accounting or regulatory environments impact this association (Leuz
2003a).
First, I find that deregistration from the U.S. is associated with a significant increase in
abnormal accruals, a lower probability of reporting a loss, and less timely loss recognition,
compared to both before the firm deregistered and to a matched sample of non-deregistering firms.
Next, I conduct tests to determine the source of this negative association between deregistration
and accounting quality. Given the proliferation of IFRS in recent years and the SEC’s acceptance
of IFRS-prepared financial statements of foreign issuers, I use IFRS as a proxy for home market
accounting environments that are similar to the U.S. After introducing this variable into the
research design and interacting it with post-deregistration firm-year observations, I find that the
decrease in accounting quality after deregistration is mitigated by the use of IFRS and is
attributable only to those firms returning to non-IFRS home markets. While these results show
that changes in firms’ accounting environments appears to drive the deregistration effect, I also
conduct tests to control for the regulatory quality in the home market. I utilize the World Bank’s
Regulatory Quality index to identify firm-year observations in which home markets provided
comparable or better regulatory quality than the U.S. and use this variable to proxy for home
market regulatory quality. However, tests using this regulatory quality proxy and interacting it
with post-deregistration firm-year observations produce no significant results across all three
accounting quality proxies. My final analysis combines the tests described and simultaneously
controls for the home market accounting and regulatory environments. By separately including
interactions of post-cross-listing firm-year observations with proxies for disclosure and
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enforcement, I show that even after controlling for differences in the regulatory environments
between the U.S. and home markets, differences in home market accounting environments remains
a significant factor in explaining changes in accounting quality for deregistering firms (Bailey et
al. 2006).
This paper exploits the unique setting of deregistration from the U.S. It addresses Leuz
(2003a)’s suggestion that cross-listing studies should try to separate the cross-sectional variation
in listing effects by adding interactive effects with institutional variables or firm characteristics.
By separating the two main drivers of cross-listing effects, U.S. disclosure requirements and U.S.
regulatory oversight, I determine the source of the negative association between deregistration and
accounting quality. While there is self-selection involved in the decision to voluntary deregister
from the U.S., the setting allows me to conduct multiple levels of analysis to ensure I am capturing
post-deregistration effects only. I use the firm as its own control, as well as match the deregistering
firm to a non-deregistering firm in the same year and country, to mitigate the effect of concurrent
changes in home country economies and institutions and focus on the impact of the firm’s release
from the SEC’s jurisdiction on its accounting quality (Gordon et al. 2009). The main results are
robust to additional analysis which shows the pre-deregistration accounting quality attributes of
deregistering firms are not significantly different compared to non-deregistering matched firms or
between deregistering IFRS and deregistering non-IFRS firms before deregistration.
The results in this paper extend and support the notion that the use of IFRS has impacted
the market of cross-border listings as foreign firms using IFRS maintain the same level of
accounting quality in their home markets as when they were listed on U.S. exchanges (e.g. Chen
et al. 2015). Differences in home market accounting environments are a significant factor in
explaining changes in accounting quality for firms deregistering from the U.S. This study is of
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importance to regulators and investors as it shows the potential costs to investors (a decrease in
financial reporting quality) stemming from deregistration from the U.S. and the types of home
markets that offset this effect.
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Figure 1.1: Number of foreign firms listed on major U.S. exchanges 2004-2012
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This figure plots the number of foreign listings on major U.S. stock exchanges (AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE) from
2004 to 2012. The data for each year are taken from the December reports published by the World Federation of
Exchanges, which has been used extensively in cross-listing literature (e.g. Karolyi 2012; Fernandes and Gianetti
2013; Sarkissian and Schill 2014).

Figure 1.2: Number of new cross-listings and deregistrations on major U.S. exchanges 2004-2012

New Cross-Listings and Deregistrations on Major U.S.
Exchanges
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Cross-listings

2009

2010

2011

2012

Deregistrations

This figure plots the number of new cross-listings on major U.S. stock exchanges (AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE)
from 2004 to 2012 and the number of deregistrations from major U.S. stock exchanges over the same time period.
The data for each year obtained from the online ADR directories of Bank of New York, Citibank, and JP Morgan
Chase.
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Table 1.1:Sample composition
Panel A: Voluntary foreign firm deregistrations 2004-2012
Edgar Online I-Metrix Form 15F filings of voluntary & involuntary deregistrations
Bank of New York's, CitiBank's, & JP Morgan's internet ADR directories of
terminations
Duplicates between two listings
Amendment to previously filed Form 15F
Firms incorporated in US
Firm listed on OTC only, never sold securities in the US
Deregistration due to merge & acquisition
Delisted by the exchange for violating listing standards
Deregistered debt securities only
Missing data in Worldscope
Financial firms
Canadian firms
Full Sample

412
352
(309)
(21)
(43)
(84)
(42)
(8)
(75)
(35)
(12)
(13)
122

This panel reports how the final sample of 122 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from the U.S. was obtained. I
collected Form 15F filings of all foreign firm deregistrations from the Edgar Online I-Metrix database. I supplemented
this with listings of terminated ADR programs on Bank of New York, Citibank, and JP Morgan’s websites. I removed
any duplicates between the four sources of deregistering foreign firms. I further restricted the sample by eliminating
any firms incorporated in the U.S. The population of Form 15F filings obtained from Edgar contained some
amendments to previously filed Form 15F’s and as such are excluded. I removed firms that were listed on the OTC
only to limit my sample to firms required to regularly file with the SEC. Involuntary deregistrations are those due to
merger and acquisitions or violations of listing standards. I also exclude those firms that deregistered debt securities
only. Finally, I exclude financial firms, firms without sufficient data in Worldscope, and Canadian firms.
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Panel B: Sample by year and country
Voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from the U.S. by Year
2004
5
2005
8
2006
12
2007
51
2008
14
2009
13
2010
7
2011
8
2012
4
122

Voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from the U.S. by country (with mandatory IFRS adoption year)
AUSTRALIA (2005)
5
MEXICO (2012)
3
AUSTRIA (2005)
1
NETHERLANDS (2005)
8
BELGIUM (2005)
1
NEW ZEALAND (2007)
1
CHILE (2009)
3
NORWAY (2005)
3
FINLAND (2005)
3
PHILIPPINES (2007)
1
FRANCE (2005)
15 PORTUGAL (2005)
1
GERMANY (2005)
15 SINGAPORE (n/a)
2
HONG KONG (2005)
5
SOUTH AFRICA (2005)
1
HUNGARY (2005)
1
SPAIN (2005)
1
INDIA (n/a)
1
SWEDEN (2005)
3
ISRAEL (2008)
4
SWITZERLAND (n/a)
4
ITALY (2005)
4
TAIWAN (2013)
1
JAPAN (n/a)
7
UNITED KINGDOM (2005)
23
KOREA (SOUTH) (2011)
2
VENEZUELA (2007)
1
LUXEMBOURG (2005)
2
122
This panel breaks down the 122 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations by year and country. Next to each country is
the year of mandatory IFRS adoption within the jurisdiction, if applicable.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics
Panel A: Deregistering firms pre- v. post-deregistration

IFRS
RegQuality
Ln(Sales)
CFO
Leverage
Sales Growth
PPE Growth
Loss
Market-to-Book
Abn_Accruals

Deregistering:
Pre-Deregistration
N
Mean Median
783
0.621
1.000
783
0.449
0.000
760 22.090
22.417
671
0.089
0.087
763
0.587
0.590
668
0.118
0.057
671
0.093
0.039
762
0.273
0.000
722 61.775
1.853
668
0.010
0.012

Deregistering:
Post-Deregistration
N
Mean
Median
716
0.707 ***
1.000
716
0.626 ***
1.000
643 22.161
22.528
637
0.089
0.086
614
0.576
0.567
642
0.063 ***
0.028
641
0.056 **
0.037
642
0.224 **
0.000
631 58.602
1.968
610
0.015 **
0.015

***
***

***
**
*

This panel details the characteristics of the 122 foreign firms that voluntary deregistered from U.S. exchanges from
2004-2012. Deregistering firms are compared in the years before deregistration to the years after deregistration, with
the year of deregistration removed from the analysis. All firm-level data are obtained from Worldscope, except as
noted below. All statistics are presented for firm-year observations. IFRS is an indicator variable coded 1 for firmyears in which financial statements are prepared according to IFRS and 0 otherwise. RegQuality is obtained using the
World Banks’s Regulatory Quality Index. Firm-year observations with upper-bound percentile ranks of regulatory
quality greater than or equal to the U.S.’s upper-bound rank are coded 1, and 0 otherwise. Ln(Sales) is the natural
logarithm of total sales. CFO is cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets. Leverage is total debt divided
by total assets. Sales Growth is measured as growth in sales from the prior year. PPE Growth is measured as the
growth in property, plant, and equipment from the prior year. Loss is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1
for firm-year observations with negative earnings, and 0 otherwise. Market-to-Book is calculated as the fiscal year end
stock price times the number of common shares outstanding divided by total shareholders’ equity. Abn_Accruals is
defined as the firm-specific residual from equation (1). ***, **, and * indicate that deregistering firms’ characteristics
before deregistration are significantly different from their characteristics after deregistration at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Panel B: Deregistering firms v. matched non-deregistering firms
Deregistering Firm:
Non-Deregistering Firm:
Post-Deregistration
Matched on Year-Nation-Industry
N
Mean
Median
N
Mean
Median
IFRS
716
0.707
1.000
836
0.738
1.000
RegQuality
716
0.626
1.000
836
0.697
1.000
Ln(Sales)
643 22.161
22.528
836 22.791
22.482
CFO/Assets
637
0.089
0.086
790
0.098 *
0.089
Leverage
614
0.576
0.567
804
0.572
0.059
Sales Growth
642
0.063
0.028
782
0.072
0.030
PPE Growth
641
0.056
0.037
782
0.097 ***
0.070 ***
Loss
642
0.224
0.000
836
0.283 **
0.000 **
Market-to-Book
631 58.602
1.968
795 63.676 **
1.706 **
Abn_Accruals
610
0.015
0.015
782 -0.008 ***
0.001 ***
This panel compares the characteristics of foreign firms after deregistration from U.S. exchanges with a matched
sample of foreign firms that continue to maintain a U.S. cross-listing. The match is conducted at the year-nation-2
digit SIC industry level and then the closest firm in terms of size (LnAssets). To the extent that an exact industry match
(2-digit SIC) is not available, which is the case for 12 deregistering firm observations, I match the deregistering firm
to the two nearest country-year firms in terms of size. Because of this specification, there exist a greater number of
firm-year observations for the control sample. All variables are as defined in Panel A. ***, **, and * indicate that
the characteristics of deregistering firms after leaving the U.S. differ significantly from the characteristics of nonderegistering firms that maintain a U.S. cross-listing at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.3: Abnormal accruals
Panel A: Deregistering firms only: pre-deregistration v. post-deregistration
Abn_Accruals Abn_Accruals Abn_Accruals
(1)
(2a)
(2b)
PostDereg
0.011**
0.030***
0.007
(2.02)
(2.98)
(1.07)
IFRS
0.009
-0.002
(1.27)
(0.33)
PostDereg*IFRS
-0.024**
(2.28)
RegQuality
0.001
-0.001
(0.18)
(0.18)
PostDereg*RegQuality
0.006
(1.08)
Ln(Sales)
0.004**
0.004**
0.004**
(2.53)
(2.47)
(2.50)
CFO
-0.360***
-0.347***
-0.349***
(10.25)
(9.77)
(9.77)
Leverage
-0.043***
-0.044***
-0.044***
(3.46)
(3.54)
(3.51)
Sales Growth
0.002
0.002
0.002
(0.24)
(0.22)
(0.25)
PPE Growth
0.001
0.001
0.001
(0.13)
(0.10)
(0.09)
Market-to-Book
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.25)
(0.44)
(0.39)
Lag Loss
-0.007
-0.006
-0.006
(1.59)
(1.23)
(1.27)
0.061**
0.067***
0.067***
Intercept
(2.41)
(2.63)
(2.63)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Country FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry FE

Abn_Accruals
(3)
0.029***
(2.77)
0.011
(1.39)
-0.027**
(2.58)
-0.002
(0.34)
0.009
(1.60)
0.004**
(2.50)
-0.347***
(9.84)
-0.044***
(3.58)
0.002
(0.25)
0.001
(0.07)
0.000
(0.41)
-0.006
(1.17)
0.067***
(2.63)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.65
1,179

0.65
1,179

R2
N

0.65
1,179

0.65
1,179

In this panel deregistering firms are compared before and after deregistration. The dependent variable in the OLS
regression is Abn_Accruals as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A. PostDereg is an indicator variable that takes the value
of 1 for all firm-year observations after deregistration from the U.S. and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined
in Table 1.2 Panel A. The t-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the coefficients. They are adjusted for clustering
on firms. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.3: Abnormal accruals
Panel B: Deregistering firms v. matched non-deregistering firms
Abn_Accruals
Abn_Accruals
Abn_Accruals
(1)
(2a)
(2b)
PostDereg
0.007**
0.033**
0.005
(2.01)
IFRS
PostDereg*IFRS
RegQuality

(2.47)
0.001
(0.14)
-0.027**
(2.04)
-0.005
(1.29)

0.005***
(4.33)
-0.389***
(15.38)
-0.037***
(3.63)
0.012
(1.31)
0.012**
(2.22)
0.000*
(1.96)
-0.020***
(5.83)
-0.018*
(1.73)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.005***
(4.34)
-0.388***
(15.11)
-0.038***
(3.67)
0.012
(1.29)
0.012**
(2.25)
0.000**
(2.01)
-0.020***
(5.66)
-0.014
(1.31)
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.005
(1.28)
0.003
(0.56)
0.005***
(4.31)
-0.389***
(15.21)
-0.037***
(3.61)
0.012
(1.33)
0.012**
(2.24)
0.000*
(1.71)
-0.020***
(5.79)
-0.016
(1.40)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.61
1,390

0.61
1,390

0.61
1,390

PostDereg*RegQuality
Ln(Sales)
CFO
Leverage
Sales Growth
PPE Growth
Market-to-Book
Lag Loss
Intercept
Country FE
Year FE
Industry FE
R2
N

(1.30)
0.000
(0.05)

Abn_Accruals
(3)
0.031**
(2.30)
0.001
(0.15)
-0.027**
(2.00)
-0.005
(1.34)
0.002
(0.44)
0.005***
(4.32)
-0.388***
(15.13)
-0.038***
(3.67)
0.012
(1.31)
0.012**
(2.25)
0.000*
(1.83)
-0.020***
(5.66)
-0.015
(1.32)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.61
1,390

In this panel deregistering firms are compared after deregistration to a matched sample of non-deregistering crosslisted firms. The dependent variable in the OLS regression is Abn_Accruals as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A.
PostDereg is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all firm-year observations after deregistration from the
U.S. and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A. The t-statistics are listed in parenthesis
below the coefficients. They are adjusted for clustering on firms. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.4: Loss avoidance
Panel A: Deregistering firms only: pre-deregistration v. post-deregistration
Prob(Loss)
Prob(Loss)
Prob(Loss)
(1)
(2a)
(2b)
PostDereg
-0.519**
-1.236**
-0.280
(2.06)
(2.26)
(0.78)
IFRS
-0.208
0.235
(0.57)
(0.69)
PostDereg*IFRS
1.007**
(1.99)
RegQuality
-0.386
-0.298
(1.43)
(1.02)
PostDereg*RegQuality
-0.128
(0.49)
Ln(Sales)
-0.153***
-0.172**
-0.170**
(4.35)
(2.48)
(2.48)
CFO
-12.479***
-17.493***
-17.314***
(6.88)
(6.05)
(6.03)
Leverage
1.161***
1.503***
1.488***
(3.18)
(3.20)
(3.20)
Sales Growth
0.020
0.330
0.300
(0.08)
(1.51)
(1.34)
PPE Growth
0.247
0.440
0.436
(0.66)
(0.98)
(0.98)
Lag Loss
0.630***
0.260*
0.278**
(4.35)
(1.83)
(1.96)
Market-to-Book
-0.001
0.000
0.000
(1.10)
(0.27)
(0.30)
1.448***
2.151***
Intercept
2.108***
(2.90)
(3.09)
(3.02)
2
0.45
0.50
0.50
Pseudo R
N
1,182
1,182
1,182

Prob(Loss)
(3)
-1.177**
(2.11)
-0.246
(0.66)
1.095**
(1.97)
-0.297
(1.01)
-0.225
(0.82)
-0.172**
(2.49)
-17.562***
(6.06)
1.514***
(3.18)
0.313
(1.40)
0.447
(0.99)
0.260*
(1.84)
0.000
(0.29)
2.127***
(3.06)
0.50
1,182

In this panel deregistering firms are compared before and after deregistration. The dependent variable in the probit
regression is Loss as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A. PostDereg is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all
firm-year observations after deregistration from the U.S. and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table
1.2 Panel A. The z-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.4: Loss avoidance
Panel B: Deregistering firms v. matched non-deregistering firms
Prob(Loss)
Prob(Loss)
(1)
(2a)
PostDereg
-0.245*
-0.792**
(1.82)
(2.16)
IFRS
-0.247*
(1.67)
PostDereg*IFRS
0.819**
(2.23)
RegQuality
0.235*
(1.76)
PostDereg*RegQuality
Ln(Sales)
CFO
Leverage
Sales Growth
PPE Growth
Lag Loss
Market-to-Book
Intercept
Pseudo R2
N

-0.152***
(3.40)
-9.000***
(5.54)
1.340***
(3.31)
0.426
(1.28)
0.396
(0.74)
0.900***
(6.10)
0.000
(0.27)
1.036*
(1.73)
0.39
1,392

-0.097***
(3.08)
-8.227***
(6.12)
1.008***
(3.00)
-0.066
(0.20)
0.158
(0.29)
0.946***
(7.38)
-0.003***
(3.77)
0.462
(1.07)
0.37
1,392

Prob(Loss)
(2b)
-0.246
(1.06)
-0.206
(1.38)

0.141
(0.89)
-1.590
(1.43)
-0.095***
(2.99)
-8.297***
(6.14)
1.016***
(3.01)
-0.040
(0.12)
0.173
(0.32)
0.943***
(7.31)
-0.003***
(4.31)
0.458
(1.05)
0.37
1,392

Prob(Loss)
(3)
-1.018**
(2.33)
-0.222
(1.45)
0.790**
(2.11)
0.146
(0.91)
-1.600
(1.46)
-0.095***
(2.99)
-8.299***
(6.13)
1.026***
(3.04)
-0.039
(0.12)
0.169
(0.31)
0.941***
(7.31)
-0.003***
(4.37)
0.457
(1.05)
0.37
1,392

In this panel deregistering firms are compared after deregistration to a matched sample of non-deregistering crosslisted firms. The dependent variable in the probit regression is Loss as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A. PostDereg is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all firm-year observations after deregistration from the U.S. and 0
otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A. The z-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the
coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Timely loss recognition
Panel A: Deregistering firms only: pre-deregistration years v. post-deregistration years

Neg*CFO*PostDereg
Neg*PostDereg
CFO*PostDereg
PostDereg
Neg*CFO
Neg
CFO
Ln(Sales)
Neg*Ln(Sales)
CFO*Ln(Sales)
Neg*CFO*Ln(Sales)
Leverage
Neg*Leverage
CFO*Leverage
Neg*CFO*Leverage
Market-to-Book
Neg*Market-to-Book
CFO*Market-to-Book

Full Sample
Total_Accruals
(1)

IFRS firms only
Total_Accruals
(2a)

-0.200*

0.224*

(1.73)
-0.035*
(1.83)
-0.111**
(2.09)
0.022**
(2.08)
0.151
(0.54)
-0.028
(0.64)
0.448**
(2.40)
0.010***
(5.15)
0.005
(1.47)
-0.035***
(2.63)
0.046*
(1.95)
-0.032**
(2.05)
-0.175***
(4.24)
-0.379***
(5.07)
-0.197
(1.06)
0.000***
(3.87)
0.000
(0.62)
-0.000*
(1.66)

(1.66)
0.012
(0.48)
-0.219***
(2.87)
0.032**
(2.54)
0.971**
(2.23)
-0.091*
(1.86)
0.617***
(2.73)
0.010***
(4.46)
0.009**
(2.34)
-0.050***
(2.92)
0.090*
(1.95)
-0.036**
(2.03)
-0.156***
(2.95)
-0.200*
(1.94)
-0.411
(1.55)
0.000***
(4.04)
-0.000*
(1.68)
-0.000**
(2.13)
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High RegQuality
firms only
Total_Accruals
(2b)
-0.089
(0.42)
-0.001
(0.03)
-0.036
(0.46)
0.006
(0.37)
0.921
(1.43)
-0.012
(0.18)
1.062***
(4.14)
0.014***
(5.14)
0.001
(0.17)
-0.091***
(4.61)
0.064
(0.90)
-0.034*
(1.74)
-0.084
(1.20)
-0.131
(1.21)
0.282
(0.58)
0.000
(0.71)
0.000
(0.02)
0.000
(0.79)

Neg*CFO*Market-to-Book
Intercept
Country FE
Year FE
Industry FE
R2
N

0.001*
(1.79)
-0.162***
(5.36)
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.001
(0.69)
-0.190***
(5.57)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.000
(0.07)
-0.192***
(4.87)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.72
1,307

0.71
802

0.73
780

In this panel deregistering firms are compared before and after deregistration. The dependent variable in the OLS
regression is Total_Accruals is earnings before extraordinary items less operating cash flows, scaled by lagged total
assets. PostDereg is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all firm-year observations after deregistration
from the U.S. and 0 otherwise. Neg is an indicator variable that equals 1 if cash flows from operations in year t are
negative and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A. The t-statistics are listed in
parenthesis below the coefficients. They are adjusted for clustering on firms. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Timely loss recognition
Panel B: Deregistering firms v. matched non-deregistering firms

Neg*CFO*PostDereg
Neg*PostDereg
CFO*PostDereg
PostDereg
Neg*CFO
Neg
CFO
Ln(Sales)
Neg*Ln(Sales)
CFO*Ln(Sales)
Neg*CFO*Ln(Sales)
Leverage
Neg*Leverage
CFO*Leverage
Neg*CFO*Leverage
Market-to-Book
Neg*Market-to-Book
CFO*Market-to-Book

Full Sample
Total_Accruals
(1)
-0.364**
(2.54)
-0.051**
(2.22)
-0.08
(1.42)
0.012
(1.03)
-0.188
(0.43)
0.037
(0.64)
0.262
(1.19)
0.008***
(3.19)
0.008*
(1.71)
-0.030*
(1.80)
0.090**
(2.14)
-0.050***
(2.90)
-0.251***
(5.22)
-0.226**
(2.50)
-0.948***
(4.21)
0
(1.16)
0
(1.37)
0.001***
(3.27)

IFRS firms only
Total_Accruals
(2a)
0.291*
(1.79)
-0.041
(1.46)
-0.253***
(3.27)
0.037***
(2.88)
1.363**
(2.47)
0.001
(0.02)
0.710***
(3.08)
0.009***
(4.20)
0.007
(1.32)
-0.058***
(3.38)
0.140**
(2.45)
-0.026
(1.49)
-0.183***
(3.39)
-0.200**
(2.06)
-0.355
(1.35)
0.000***
(3.92)
0
(1.42)
-0.000*
(1.85)
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High RegQuality firms
only
Total_Accruals
(2b)
-0.406
(1.43)
-0.069
(1.17)
0.063
(0.51)
-0.004
(0.20)
-0.539
(0.69)
0.002
(0.03)
0.218
(0.67)
0.007*
(1.74)
0.013
(1.32)
-0.039
(1.53)
0.134
(1.37)
-0.073
(1.54)
-0.307***
(2.75)
0.112
(0.30)
-1.563**
(2.00)
0
(0.60)
0
(0.63)
0.001*
(1.96)

Neg*CFO*Market-toBook
Intercept
Country FE
Year FE
Industry FE
R2
N

0.000

0.000

(0.69)
-0.242***
(5.58)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.52

0.001
(1.26)
-5.23
(4.54)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.51

(0.37)
-0.221***
(4.17)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.43

1,162

786

700

In this panel deregistering firms are compared after deregistration to a matched sample of non-deregistering crosslisted firms. The dependent variable in the OLS regression is Total_Accruals is earnings before extraordinary items
less operating cash flows, scaled by lagged total assets. PostDereg is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1
for all firm-year observations after deregistration from the U.S. and 0 otherwise. Neg is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if cash flows from operations in year t are negative and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in
Table 1.2 Panel A. The t-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the coefficients. They are adjusted for clustering on
firms. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Alternative accounting quality proxies—deregistering firms only
Panel A:
Deregistering Firms’ Accounting Quality
Pre-Deregistration

Post-Deregistration

Variability of OperInc /Variability of CFO

2.068

1.677***

Correlation of
ΔAcc /ΔCFO

-0.058

-0.176***

Panel B:
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Non-IFRS

Deregistering Firms’ Accounting Quality
Pre-Deregistration firm-years only
IFRS
Low RegQual

High RegQual

Variability of OperInc
/Variability of CFO

1.928

1.629

Variability of OperInc
/Variability of CFO

1.582

2.497***

Correlation of
ΔAcc/ΔCFO

-0.051

-0.075

Correlation of
ΔAcc/ΔCFO

-0.104

-0.070

Panel C:

Non-IFRS

Deregistering Firms’ Accounting Quality
Post-Deregistration firm-years only
IFRS
Low RegQual

High RegQual

Variability of OperInc
/Variability of CFO

1.649

2.292***

Variability of OperInc
/Variability of CFO

1.490

1.594

Correlation of
ΔAcc/ΔCFO

-0.200

-0.168*

Correlation of
ΔAcc/ΔCFO

-0.088

-0.182

This table compares the earnings smoothing properties of deregistering firms before and after deregistration. Panel A compares the full sample. Panel B (Panel
C) compares only pre-deregistration (post-deregistration) firm-year observations and splits the sample based on the variables IFRS and RegQual. Variability of
OperInc (Variability of CFO) is the standard deviation of operating income (cash flows from operations) scaled by lagged total assets. The correlation is the
Spearman correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash flow from operations, both scaled by lagged total assets.

Table 1.7: Alternative accounting quality proxies—deregistering firms v. matched non-deregistering firms
Panel A:

Variability of OperInc /Variability of CFO
Correlation of
ΔAcc/ΔCFO
Panel B:
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Variability of
OperInc /Variability
of CFO
Correlation of
ΔAcc/ΔCFO
Panel C:

Variability of
OperInc /Variability
of CFO
Correlation of
ΔAcc/ΔCFO

Deregistering Firms’ Accounting Quality v.
Non-Deregistering Firms' Accounting Quality
Deregistering Firms
Non-Dereg Firms
1.318
1.479**
-0.206

-0.142*

Deregistering Firms’ Accounting Quality v. Non-Deregistering Firms' Accounting Quality
IFRS Firms Only
Non-IFRS Firms Only
NonDeregistering
Deregistering
Non-Deregistering
Firms
Firms
Deregistering Firms
Firms
Variability of
OperInc
/Variability of
1.370
1.365
CFO
0.998
1.331**
Correlation of
-0.218
-0.180
ΔAcc/ΔCFO
-0.263
-0.166**
Deregistering Firms’ Accounting Quality v. Non-Deregistering Firms' Accounting Quality
High RegQual Firms Only
Low RegQual Firms Only
NonDeregistering
Deregistering
Non-Deregistering
Firms
Firms
Deregistering Firms
Firms
Variability of
OperInc
/Variability of
1.482
1.409
CFO
1.375
1.411
Correlation of
-0.240
-0.181
ΔAcc/ΔCFO
-0.206
-0.099

This table compares the earnings smoothing properties of deregistering firms to non-deregistering firms. Panel A compares the full sample. Panels B and C split
the sample based on the variables IFRS and RegQual, respectively. Measurements are as defined in Table 1.6.

Chapter 2: As foreign registrants abandon the U.S. capital markets, what happens to the
cross-listing audit fee premium?
2.1

Introduction
A common strategy for non-U.S. firms to signal their quality to global capital markets was

to register and cross-list in the United States. In exchange for the costs of complying with U.S.
accounting standards and subjecting themselves to a more stringent regulatory environment, these
firms were able to potentially generate economic synergies (Sarkissian and Schill 2004), improve
the efficiency of their securities’ pricing (Foerester and Karolyi 1999), and bond management to
investor-friendly behavior (Coffee 2002).21 The impacts of compliance flowed through to their
audit firms who now faced more complex accounting requirements and exposure to a higher degree
of legal liability. Prior literature has found that through 2002 it is the latter factor, the shift in legal
and not accounting regimes, that is the leading source of cross-listing audit fee premiums,
documented to be as much as twenty to thirty percent (Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn 2002; Choi,
Kim, Liu, and Simunic 2009).
Since the end of these early studies on the cross-listing audit fee premium, there has been
a global movement away from local country generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to
a coalescing around the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)22,
standardizing accounting reporting practices with a resultant improvement in accounting quality
(Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008). The growing use of IFRS has also introduced an additional
factor into audit pricing. DeGeorge, Ferguson, and Spear (2013) argue that the greater knowledge

21

Additional benefits of cross-listing in the U.S. include increases in market valuation, accounting quality and analyst
following, and a lower cost of capital (e.g. Lang, Lins, and Miller 2003a; Lang, Raedy, and Yetman 2003b; Doidge,
Karolyi, and Stulz 2004; Hail and Leuz 2009).
22
In 2002, the European Union mandated the use of IFRS, as set by the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB), for all publicly listed companies beginning in 2005, with a number of countries following suit thereafter. See
http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Documents/2015/Who-We-Are-January-2015.pdf for a timeline of major IFRS
events.
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needed to understand IFRS and the increased effort in applying auditing procedures to reduce the
risk of material misstatement lead to an increase in audit fees.

The authors find an audit fee

premium incremental to normal yearly increases in audit fees which they conclude stems from the
change in accounting standards and which persists beyond the initial year of adoption. However,
in this single country setting the authors are not able to address the link between IFRS and U.S.
GAAP costs. Kim, Liu, and Zheng (2012) extend these results into a multi-country setting and
find an IFRS audit fee premium across the European Union following mandatory adoption. Kim
et al. discuss how changing from local GAAP to IFRS causes an “upward shift in audit complexity”
(p. 2064) and this complexity extends beyond initial adoption to produce an IFRS premium in
subsequent years.
Around the same time as the development of IFRS, the regulatory fall-out from accounting
scandals like Enron and WorldCom led to changes in regulatory and legal requirements worldwide.
In the U.S., the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was created in 2002 to
oversee, regulate, and inspect auditors of both foreign and domestic registrants. Many other
jurisdictions followed suit creating their own local audit regulators23 (Lamoreaux 2016) and thus,
this time period also reflects a changing global legal landscape. The SEC believed that the
combination of these accounting and regulatory developments were a threat to the U.S. crosslisting market.
To increase the attractiveness of the U.S. as a cross-listing venue, the SEC adopted Rule
12h-6 in March 2007 which relaxed the deregistration requirements for foreign firms listed in the
U.S. The SEC argued this amendment “should result in reduced costs to issuers in determining
whether they can terminate their Exchange Act reporting obligations” (SEC 2007b, 19) because

23

Lamoreaux (2016) finds that PCAOB inspection access increases audit quality in jurisdictions with and without a
local regulator, however, its impact is greater in jurisdictions without a local regulator.
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deregistration requirements will be based on more easily obtainable information and will not
require annual re-verification.24 The SEC believed the change in legislation would encourage
more firms to cross-list in the U.S. However, the result was quite different and there has been a
growing trend in voluntary deregistrations as compared to new cross-listings in recent years (see
Figure 2.1).
Examining deregistrations, foreign firms leaving the U.S. accounting and legal
environment, provides an interesting setting to determine which of these factors has a greater effect
in the setting of audit fees. I study an environment where foreign cross-listed firms have left the
U.S. and moved into different legal and accounting regimes in their home markets. The former
influences auditors’ assessment of risk due to legal liability exposure, while the latter impacts
auditors’ effort due to complexity of the standards.
While many of these deregistering firms return to home markets which mandate the use of
IFRS, there are also firms which return to reporting environments in which local accounting
standards, generally thought to be less complex than IFRS or U.S. GAAP, are required. Similarly,
many firms return to home markets with levels of legal liability comparable to the U.S., while for
others deregistration signals a decrease in auditors’ liability exposure. It is thus an empirical
question which factor better explains the impact on audit fees following deregistration from U.S.
exchanges.
Deregistration from the U.S. allows me to conduct multiple levels of analysis. For a sample
of 105 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations (with necessary data available) from 2004 to 2013, I
first examine the association between deregistration and audit fees. In both univariate and crosssectional analyses, I find that audit fees are significantly lower in the year after deregistration

24

See footnote #1 in Chapter 1 for a detailed description of Rule 12h-6.
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compared to the year before deregistration for deregistering firms. Utilizing a difference-indifference research design I reach similar conclusions when examining the audit fees of
deregistering firms and a matched set of control firms that continue to maintain a U.S. cross-listing.
To determine whether this main effect can be attributed to a decrease in legal liability or
complexity I next add to the models measures of the home market.25 First, I utilize the Wingate
(1997) index to capture the legal liability regime in the home market.26 Second, I measure home
markets that mandate the use of IFRS, which allows me to capture firms whose financial reporting
remains complex following deregistration. After adding these measures to the model, both
separately and jointly, I find that while the decrease in audit fees is mitigated for firms using IFRS,
the strength of the home market’s legal regime has no effect on the negative association between
deregistration and audit fees. Thus, the results show that the decrease in complexity for non-IFRS
firms relative to IFRS firms is the main driver of the lower level of audit fees following
deregistration. Further tests using the change in audit fees supports the main results that it is the
change in complexity, and not the change in legal liability, stemming from deregistration that
drives the change in audit fees after foreign firms leave the U.S.27
By incorporating an important element that did not exist at the time of their studies,
specifically the widespread use of IFRS, I extend the results in Seetharaman et al. (2002) and Choi
et al. (2009) to show that the cross-listing audit fee premium disappears for firms whose audit
complexity decreases after deregistration (non-IFRS firms), while firms with no change in
complexity (IFRS firms) experience no significant audit fee changes around deregistration. While

25

Leuz (2003a) argues that prior research has focused on the main or average effect of cross-listing rather than
potentially more interesting interactive effects of institutional variables, which are important for analyzing crosslisting effects in cross-sectional research designs. He encourages researchers to “exploit institutional differences
across settings to tease out the sources of cross-listing effects” (p. 352).
26
The results are robust to alternative proxies (see Section 2.5).
27
Given the Wingate (1997) index is a static measure, I utilize a legal liability proxy from the World Bank in the
changes analyses. See Section 2.5 for details.
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this appears to stand in contrast to the earlier studies that find audit fees are driven by changes in
legal liability, the result is attributable to the significant developments in the accounting and
auditing landscape brought about by IFRS adoption in the past decade (Kim et al. 2012; DeGeorge
et al. 2013). This study contributes to the literature by combining research on cross-listing, IFRS,
and auditing. While the results show specifically the influence IFRS has on audit fees in a crosslisting setting, it also addresses more broadly the impact of IFRS on the global business
environment. The paper also adds to recent literature on foreign firm deregistrations (e.g. Hostak,
Lys, Yang, and Carr 2013; Li 2014).
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section develops the
hypotheses. The sample selection and research design are discussed in Section 2.3, followed by
the main results and a discussion of additional analyses in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, respectively.
Finally, Section 2.6 concludes the paper.
2.2

Hypotheses Development
In a competitive market, audit fees are modeled as the sum of the auditor’s expected future

losses and the auditor’s production costs (Simunic 1980). Future losses stem from any costs
incurred because of litigation against the auditor for their role in the engagement. The probability
of litigation occurring and the extent of potential losses are functions of the legal liability regime
to which an audit firm is subject. Productions costs are related to the auditor’s effort. The effort
level is determined by the auditee’s size, risk, and complexity (Simunic 1980; Hay, Knechel, and
Wong 2006). Focusing on the last determinant, audit fees increase with complexity as this captures
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the characteristics of an auditee that are difficult and time-consuming to audit, leading to greater
auditor effort.28
It has been shown, both theoretically and empirically, that as a country’s legal regime
becomes stronger, the auditor’s potential loss exposure due to litigation increases, leading to higher
audit fees (Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic 2008). By cross-listing in the U.S., firms subject their
auditors to the added scrutiny of the U.S. legal environment. Case law has shown that the 1934
Securities Act’s antifraud provisions have transnational jurisdiction, applying in particular to nonU.S. auditors (Seetharaman et al. 2002). To cover this exposure, Seetharaman et al. find that U.K.
auditors charge higher audit fees when clients cross-list in the U.S., but not other markets.
Expanding upon this study, Choi et al. (2009) examine world-wide cross-listings and find an
economically significant audit fee premium for firms cross-listing in environments with stronger
legal regimes compared to their home markets. Following these arguments, if legal liability
exposure is one of the leading determinants of cross-listed firms’ audit fees, then the association
between deregistration and audit fees is expected to be influenced by the strength of the home
market’s legal environment as compared to the U.S.
However, prior literature has shown that there is relatively little oversight and enforcement
by the SEC of cross-listed firms (Siegel 2005). Cheng, Srinivasan, and Yu (2014) find that the
litigation rate against foreign cross-listed firms is significantly lower than that of a matched U.S.
sample with similar ex-ante litigation risk. They conclude, therefore, that the threat of lawsuits
does not restrain corporate misreporting for foreign firms as strongly as it does for U.S. firms.
Similarly, Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu (2015) find that the lower number of restatements for cross-

28

Audit fees are also positively associated with the two other determinants of auditor effort: client size, as proxied by
total assets, and client risk, historically proxied by inventory, receivables, negative earnings, and leverage, among
others (Simunic 1980; Hay et al. 2006).
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listed firms compared to U.S. firms is attributable to less stringent monitoring. Given these
arguments of lax enforcement and low liability exposure that already exist before deregistration,
audit fees following deregistration are not expected to be influenced by changes in the auditor’s
legal environment.
The other main determinant of audit fees, complexity, has typically been measured in the
audit fee literature by variables such as a client’s subsidiaries or segments, proportion of foreign
assets, or cross-listing status (e.g. Simunic 1980; Choi et al. 2008). This last feature is of particular
importance when the cross-listing venue is the U.S. due to the stringent accounting and disclosure
requirements of the SEC. Since 1980 the SEC has required foreign firms to reconcile their
financial statements to U.S. GAAP because “investors’ need for the same type of basic information
implies that foreign and domestic registrants should be subject to the same disclosure
requirements” (SEC 2007c).29 However, in the decades since the reconciliation requirements were
first established, the accounting landscape has significantly changed with the increasing use of
IFRS. The SEC realized that the:
“auditor community has embraced IFRS as a workable set of standards that can generally
be applied across industries and countries. The global auditing profession has been able to
audit and report on many thousands of financial statements prepared using either IFRS as
published by the IASB or a jurisdictional variation of IFRS” (SEC 2007c).
Recognizing the global growth of IFRS audited financial statements and its comparable highquality with U.S. GAAP, the SEC enacted an amendment in 2007 allowing the acceptance of IFRSprepared financial statements in SEC filings without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP for cross-listed
firms.30

Before 1980, SEC guidance with respect to financial statements of foreign issuers required only that the “accounting
principles used by foreign private issuers have authoritative support”. Annual reports required only a narrative
description of the differences between foreign accounting principles and U.S. GAAP (SEC 2007c).
30
See Section 2.5 for a more robust discussion of this time period, as well as additional empirical tests conducted
around the new legislation.
29
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The adoption of IFRS is associated with a significant audit fee premium. Kim et al. (2012)
and DeGeorge et al. (2013) find the complexity of the fair-value oriented and principals-based
standards results in greater auditor effort leading to higher audit fees. DeGeorge et al. (2013)
conduct a single-country study, and thus, in holding the legal enforcement environment constant,
they conclude the complexity of IFRS drives the audit fee premium. Kim et al. (2012) find mixed
results when examining the impact of legal regimes on the IFRS-related audit fee premium across
the European Union and find no support that concurrent reforms in corporate governance or
enforcement mechanisms are the source of the audit fee effects. Both studies additionally find this
audit fee premium exists even after the initial adoption year, indicating potential long-term effects
for IFRS firms.31
Because of the growing use of IFRS in the last decade as well as the requirement that only
local GAAP-using firms must continue to reconcile their financial statements to U.S. GAAP,
foreign firms do not experience a uniform decrease in audit complexity following deregistration
from U.S. exchanges. If complexity is the dominant determinant of audit fees for cross-listed
firms, then the association between deregistration and audit fees is expected to be influenced by
the use of IFRS in the home market.
However, Seetharaman et al. (2002) find no significant difference in the audit fee premium
for U.K. firms cross-listed on the U.S. OTC market compared to U.K. firms cross-listed on major
U.S. exchanges, where the accounting disclosure requirements are more stringent. 32 Similarly,
Choi et al. (2009) find no significant audit fee premiums for firms cross-listed on exchanges with

31

On the other hand, Goncharov, Riedl, and Sellhorn (2014) find that firms that switch to reporting assets at fair value
following mandatory IFRS adoption, on average, experience a reduction in audit fees. However, the authors find that
audit fees are increasing in the complexity of measuring fair value. The study examines firms in the European real
estate industry. To account for any differences due to industry-specific auditing conditions, the models include
industry fixed effects.
32
See footnote #10 in Chapter 1 for a classification of the types of cross-listings on U.S. exchanges.
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regimes similar or weaker to their home market and argue the complexity of cross-listing does not
drive audit fee increases. However, as Choi et al. (2009) point out, there exists the possibility that
audit complexity increases only when a firm is cross-listed in stronger not weaker legal regimes,
and thus, it is complexity that is behind the cross-listing audit fee premium. Additionally, as
mentioned earlier, these studies were both completed before the adoption of IFRS, which
significantly changed the cross-listing market.
2.3

Sample Selection and Research Design
The sample period starts in 2004 coinciding with the final adoption of SOX and the start

of wide-spread mandatory adoption of IFRS. Table 2.1 Panel A details the sample composition.
Due to changes in form filing requirements during the sample period, two sources are utilized to
obtain foreign firm deregistrations. Following the enactment of Rule 12h-6 in March 2007, all
foreign firm deregistrations are filed under SEC Form 15F, as opposed to the earlier SEC Form 15
which contained both foreign and domestic deregistrations. Using the Edgar Online I-Metrix
database, I collect 439 involuntary and voluntary Form 15Fs filed from March 2007 through
December 2013. To collect deregistrations from 2004 through February 2007 and ensure complete
coverage in the Edgar Online I-Metrix database for the latter sample period, I also utilize the online
ADR directories of Bank of New York, Citibank, and JP Morgan to obtain all voluntary and
involuntary foreign firm deregistrations throughout the sample period.33 Any duplicates between
the two listings are eliminated, as well as any amendments to previously filed forms.
The sample is further restricted to include only foreign firms subject to SEC disclosure
requirements and thus excludes OTC listed firms or firms incorporated in the U.S. I read through
all Form 15 or 15F filings as well as additional proxy statements or press releases to ensure that I

33

See adrbnymellon.com, citiadr.idmanagedsolutions.com, and adr.com, respectively.
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capture only voluntary deregistrations. Forty-four firms are eliminated that deregister due to a
merger and acquisition and 8 that were delisted by their U.S. exchanges due to violating listing
requirements. I also focus only on firms deregistering equity securities. As information is collected
after deregistration from the U.S., audit fee data availability is subject to individual country-level
regulation. As such, 61 firms are eliminated due to missing audit fee disclosures or other necessary
financial information in the Worldscope database.34 After also eliminating financial firms, the
sample stands at 118 voluntary foreign deregistrations. Finally, because Canadian firms crosslisted in the U.S. are not classified as “ADRs” and are exempt from the U.S. reporting rules
required of other cross-listed firms, consistent with prior literature, Canadian firms are eliminated
from the sample.
The final sample consists of 105 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from 2004 through
2013. Table 2.1 Panel B shows there is a spike in 2007, the year deregistration requirements were
lessened. However, including year fixed effects in all regressions eliminates concern about any
time-specific trends influencing the analysis. The U.K., France, and Germany represent the highest
number of deregistering firms. It is of note that when examining the breakdown of deregistering
firms by year and country the sample composition is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Marosi and
Massoud 2008; Doidge et al. 2010; Hostak et al. 2013).
Deregistration from the U.S. provides an interesting setting because it allows me to conduct
multiple levels of analyses. First, by comparing audit fees in the pre- and post-deregistration
periods for deregistering firms only, each firm is its own control, and the focus is on changes in
the level of audit fees, while controlling for other time-invariant firm and country characteristics.

34

I lose 5 deregistering firms because of lack of data availability for the legal liability proxy, the Wingate index
(Hungary, Israel, and Luxembourg). In sensitivity tests using World Bank legal proxies in both levels and changes
analyses I include these additional observations and find the results unaltered.
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Second, comparing audit fees for deregistering firms to a matched group of non-deregistering
cross-listed firms using a difference-in-difference research design controls for other general trends
or changes in the economic environment unrelated to deregistration.

2.3.1 Levels Analyses: Deregistering Firms Only
The models used in this paper are based on the seminal work by Simunic (1980) which
measures audit fees as a function of client size, risk, and complexity. To first establish whether
there is an association between deregistration and audit fees for deregistering firms, the following
OLS regression is run (firm and year subscripts omitted):
Ln(Audit Fees) = β0 + β1Post + δControls + Fixed Effects + e

(1),

where Ln(AuditFees) is the natural logarithm of audit fees from Worldscope. The main variable of
interest in this model that includes only deregistering firms is Post, an indicator variable which
takes the value of 1 for all firm-year observations in the year after deregistration from the U.S. and
0 for all firm-year observations in the year before deregistration, with the year of deregistration
removed from the analysis. A negative coefficient on Post indicates that firms have lower audit
fees in the year after deregistration compared to the year before. 35 After first examining whether
deregistration from the U.S. and audit fees are associated, I then test whether the source of this
association stems from changes in legal liability or changes in complexity.
To measure an auditor’s liability exposure, I utilize the Wingate (1997) index which has
been used extensively in the auditing literature to proxy for a country’s litigation risk (e.g. Choi et

35

In this section, I only examine the short window comparing the year before to the year after deregistration for
deregistering firms. In further analyses in Section 2.5, I extend this model to examine a longer time-series and find
the results are statistically similar. As this long-term analysis suffers from issues of potential additional confounding
firm events that have not been controlled for, the main tests focus on the shorter time frame surrounding deregistration.
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al. 2008; Choi et al. 2009; Asthana, Raman, and Xu 2015). It was developed by an international
insurance underwriter for one of the Big 6 audit firms and represents the risks an auditor faces in
a particular country based on the country’s legal, regulatory, political, and economic environments
(Wingate 1997; Choi et al. 2009). The index ranges from 1 to 10, with higher values indicating a
more litigious environment.36 Regime is defined as the natural logarithm of the index. This
variable is interacted with post-deregistration firm-year observations to examine if the legal
environment auditor’s face in the home market is associated with the relationship, if any, between
audit fees and deregistration using the following OLS model:
Ln(AuditFees) = β0 + β1Post + β2Regime + β3Post*Regime + δControls + Fixed Effects + e (2).
If the coefficient on Post is negative, while the coefficient on the interaction term is positive, this
indicates that the negative association between audit fees and deregistration is driven by a decrease
in legal liability exposure.
To test whether complexity influences the association between deregistration and audit
fees, I utilize the growth in IFRS usage throughout the sample period and arguments from prior
literature that the new accounting standards have shifted audit complexity upward (Kim et al. 2012;
DeGeorge et al. 2013). Complexity is measured using an indicator variable, IFRS, which takes
the value of 1 for firm-year observations in which financial statements are prepared using IFRS
and 0 otherwise.37 The model in equation (2) is rerun, to test whether complexity influences the
association between deregistration and audit fees:
Ln(AuditFees) = β0 + β1Post + β2IFRS + β3Post*IFRS + δControls + Fixed Effects + e

(3).

Given the Wingate index is static, I am unable to calculate the change in a country’s value from before to after
deregistration for the sample firms. As such, when I discuss the change analyses in the following sections, I introduce
an alternative proxy for a country’s legal regime that is a yearly measure.
37
It is of note that none of the 105 deregistering firms in the sample are voluntary IFRS adopters. Thus, the variable
IFRS in this study captures firms whose home markets mandate the use of IFRS.
36
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In this model, Post on its own captures deregistering firms returning to home markets that have
not adopted IFRS. For these firms, deregistration from the U.S. signals a reduction in audit
complexity as the firm is no longer required to prepare a U.S. GAAP reconciliation and returns to
using only local accounting standards. A negative coefficient on Post combined with a positive
coefficient on Post*IFRS indicates that audit fees decrease because of a reduction in complexity.
This implies that firms returning to IFRS environments, where complexity levels are comparable
to the U.S., experience no significant change in audit fees around deregistration, while the audit
fee decrease can be attributed to non-IFRS firms, whose complexity level decreases following
deregistration. Lastly, I combine models (2) and (3) to simultaneously control for both changes in
legal liability and complexity.38
All the models described above contain control variables prior literature has found to be
strong determinants of audit fees and are collected from the Worldscope database (Simunic 1980;
Hay et al. 2006; DeFond and Zhang 2014). The natural log of total assets (LnAssets) is used to
measure size. To capture client risk, I use the ratio of inventory and receivables to total assets
(Inv_Rec), the return on assets ratio (ROA), negative net income years (Loss), the debt to equity
ratio (Leverage), and the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (Current Ratio). While client
complexity is captured using IFRS in the models, I also include the number of business and
geographic segments as well as whether there were any acquisitions or disposals during the year,
all of which represent hard and time-consuming areas of the audit (Ln(Bus Seg), Ln(Geo Seg),
Acquisition).

Indicator variables for Big-N auditors (Big4), December yearend clients

38

In addition to the combined model with all interaction terms, in the test of legal liability using model 2, I control for
complexity (IFRS) and in the test of complexity using model 3, I control for legal liability (Regime).
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(DecemberYE), and qualified audit opinions (Qualified)39 are also included, as these variables have
been shown in prior literature to be positively related to audit fees. Lastly, country, year, and
industry fixed effects are included to account for potential variation in audit fees across the
different groups or time periods.40
2.3.2 Difference-in-Difference: Deregistering and Non-Deregistering Firms
While the previous analyses enables me to use the firm as its own control and compare
audit fees in the year after to the year before deregistration, I am unable to control for other general
trends or changes in the economic environment unrelated to deregistration. Therefore, I conduct
a difference-in-differences test using a control sample of matched non-deregistering firms. By
matching deregistering firms with non-deregistering firms on country, year, industry and size41, I
control for any concurrent changes in audit fees that may also affect non-deregistering firms and
confound the results from the analyses discussed in the prior section. I estimate the following OLS
model:
Ln(AuditFees) = β0 + β1Post + β2Dereg + β3Post*Dereg + δControls + Fixed Effects + e

(4).

The variable that separates treatment from control firms in this model is Dereg. Dereg
takes the value of 1 for all firm-year observations in the treatment sample (i.e. deregistering firms)
and 0 for all firm-year observations in the control sample (i.e. matched non-deregistering firms).
Post takes the value of 1 for observations after deregistration and 0 for observations before

39

None of the deregistering firms received a qualified audit opinion in the years under study. As such this variable is
not included in regression output in the tables that include only deregistering firms. However, one matched nonderegistering firm received a qualified audit opinion, and thus this variable appears in those regression results.
40
All reported t-statistics in the tables listed in parentheses below the coefficients result from robust standard errors
clustered at the firm-level.
41
I use Ln(Assets) to proxy for firm size as prior literature has found this to be the leading determinant of audit fees
(Hay et al. 2006). To match on industry, I use 2-digit SIC codes. To the extent an exact industry match cannot be
found, given the small sample size, rather than lose observations I match on only country, year, and size. Similarly,
if an exact country match cannot be found the observation is matched on year, industry, and size with an observation
from a country with a similar legal and accounting environment. This is only the case for 4 New Zealand sample
firms that are matched to 4 Australian control firms. Including controls for industry and country fixed effects in all
regressions alleviates any issues with this relaxation in matching criteria.
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deregistration. For the control sample, I assign pseudo-deregistration years based on the matched
deregistering firm’s year of deregistration and Post is thus measured in the same way as described
for deregistering firms (Kim et al. 2012). Pre-deregistration consists of firm-year observations of
up to four years before deregistration or pseudo-deregistration (Post equal to 0).

Post-

deregistration consists of firm-year observations from one year after deregistration or pseudoderegistration (Post equal to 1). In this model, the coefficient of interest is the interaction term,
which captures the incremental change in audit fees from the pre- to post-deregistration period in
the treatment sample relative to the incremental change in the control sample. The control
variables and fixed effects are as described in the previous section.
As in the levels analyses, I am also interested in the role institutional factors play in the
association between deregistration and audit fees.

As such, I estimate the following two

regressions to determine if the home country’s legal or accounting environment impact audit fees:
Ln(AuditFees) = β0 + β1Post + β2Dereg + β3Post*Dereg + β4Regime + β5Post*Regime +
Β6Dereg*Regime + Β7Post*Dereg*Regime + δControls + Fixed Effects + e

(5).

Ln(AuditFees) = β0 + β1Post + β2Dereg + β3Post*Dereg + β4IFRS + β5Post*IFRS +
Β6Dereg*IFRS + Β7Post*Dereg*IFRS + δControls + Fixed Effects + e

(6).

Post and Dereg are as defined in equation (4) and Regime and IFRS as in equations (2) and (3),
respectively.

In equation (5), finding a positive coefficient on three-way interaction

(Post*Dereg*Regime) along with a negative coefficient on the two-way interaction (Post*Dereg)
indicates that the incremental decrease in audit fees following deregistration is mitigated for firms
returning to home markets with more litigious legal environments. Similarly, a positive coefficient
on three-way interaction (Post*Dereg*IFRS) in equation (6) indicates that the incremental
decrease in audit fees following deregistration is mitigated for firms returning to home markets
that mandate the use of IFRS. The control variables, fixed effects, and robust firm-level clustered

64

standard errors are as described in the previous section. As in the earlier analyses, the year (or
pseudo-year) of deregistration is removed from the analysis.
2.4

Results
Table 2.2 presents a univariate analysis of the 105 deregistering firms in the year before

and the year after deregistration. The mean and median of the main dependent variable, Ln(Audit
Fees), is statistically and significantly different between the two time periods. Compared to the
year before, foreign firms have a significantly lower level of audit fees in the year following
deregistration from the U.S.

Interestingly, the remaining firm characteristics, which are

determinants of audit fees, have not changed significantly between the two periods. Overall, there
appear to be no significant changes in firms’ operations between the two time-periods, other than
deregistration from the U.S., which could be driving the decrease in audit fees.42
2.4.1 Levels Analyses: Deregistering Firms Only
The results from running a cross-sectional regression of the level of audit fees on the
sample of deregistering firms only are displayed in Table 2.3. The test for the main effect of this
association is displayed in column (1) with Post as the main variable of interest. After controlling
for other determinants of audit fees, the coefficient on this variable is negative and significant. In
terms of economic significance, firms deregistering from the U.S. experience a 47% decrease in
audit fees in the year after versus the year before deregistration.43
To determine the source of this negative association, column (2) in Table 2.3 includes the
Regime interaction term to determine if the legal environment in the home market influences the
relationship between deregistration and audit fees. While the indicator Post continues to be

42

All univariate and multivariate results are statistically and economically robust to converting audit fees and assets
to U.S. dollar amounts.
43
Following prior audit fee studies, I measure economic significance as (ea-1), where a denotes the coefficient on the
variable of interest (e.g. Seetharaman et al. 2002; Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009).
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negative and significant, the coefficient on Post*Regime is statistically insignificant. Thus, the
legal environment in the home market does not affect the association between deregistration and
audit fees. Firms returning to home markets characterized by stringent legal liability experience
the same significant decrease in audit fees as those firms returning to home markets with lower
legal liability exposure for auditors.
To examine the other potential source of deregistration effects, in column (3) the
interaction of IFRS and Post captures firms experiencing no change in audit complexity following
deregistration. Post continues to be negative and statistically significant, implying those firms
returning to non-IFRS environments experience a significant decrease in audit fees, attributable to
the decrease in audit complexity. On the other hand, the interaction term Post*IFRS is positive
and significant indicating the decrease in audit fees is mitigated by the use of IFRS in the home
market. Thus, the negative association between deregistration and audit fees is driven by the
change in audit complexity for foreign firms.
The insignificant coefficient on IFRS is also notable as it shows that before deregistration
accounting standards were not significantly associated with the level of audit fees. Though prior
studies have found IFRS users experience an audit fee premium over domestic GAAP users, the
complexity domestic GAAP users face in the U.S. due to SEC reporting requirements resulted in
no significant difference in audit fees between the two groups. The coefficients on Post and
Post*IFRS thus capture the extent to which the act of deregistration impacts audit fees and ensures
the results are not being driven by any pre-existing difference in the level of audit fees between
the two groups.44

44

See Section 2.5 for a further discussion and analyses of the association between pre-deregistration audit fees and
accounting standards, specifically the changing requirements for IFRS firms in the U.S. over the sample period.
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Column (4) in Table 2.3 combines columns (2) and (3) to simultaneously control for both
the legal and accounting environments in the home market post-deregistration. Similar to the
results in column (3), the last column continues to show a negative association between audit fees
and deregistration from U.S. markets and that this negative relationship is mitigated by the use of
IFRS. The insignificant coefficient on Post*Regime and the significant positive coefficient on
Post*IFRS confirms that the source of the deregistration effect appears to be a change in audit
complexity for cross-listed firms. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the control
variables remain the same across all four specifications. The high R-squared values are consistent
with prior audit fee studies and the use of country, year, and industry fixed effects.
2.4.2 Difference-in-Difference: Deregistering and Non-Deregistering Firms
Table 2.4 shows the results from the difference-in-difference research design tested on the
sample of deregistering firms and matched non-deregistering firms. In Column (1) the coefficient
on Post shows that non-deregistering firms from the control sample experienced an average 5.25%
decrease in audit fees. Post*Dereg shows the incremental fee decreasing effect associated with
deregistration from the U.S. in the treatment sample. A deregistering firm experienced an average
43.7% decrease in audit fees in the post-deregistration period.45 This is approximately a 38%
greater average decrease in fees than in the benchmark non-deregistering group.
Columns (2) and (3) test the source of this negative association between deregistration and
audit fees. Consistent with the results in Table 2.3, these two columns show that it is the decrease
in audit complexity and not the decrease in legal liability which drives the decrease in audit fees.
The interaction term that includes institutional factors is insignificant in column (2) (i.e.
Post*Dereg*Regime), while column (3) finds a negative association between deregistration and

45

This figure is obtained by analyzing the coefficients on Post and Post*Dereg together: exp(β1 + β3) - 1.
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audit fees, which is mitigated by the use of IFRS (Post*Dereg*IFRS). Lastly, as in Table 2.3, the
last column shows that after controlling for both the home market legal and accounting
environments, the negative association between deregistration and audit fees is driven by firms
experiencing a decrease in audit complexity and not by firms experiencing a decrease in legal
liability. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the control variables remain the same
across all four specifications.
2.5

Additional Analyses

2.5.1 Change Analyses
To mitigate concern about potential problems of correlated omitted variables, I also
conduct change analyses. These regressions control for any time trends or unobservable firmspecific effects. Given the proxy for legal liability (Regime) is a static index from Wingate (1997),
I am unable to calculate the change in this measurement from the year before to the year after
deregistration. Thus, I use a non-static proxy for legal liability.46 To measure the changing legal
liability environment in a country, I obtain the Rule of Law index from the World Bank’s
Worldwide Governance Indicators, a dataset produced by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2013)
covering the time periods and countries in the sample.47 This dataset has been used extensively in
prior literature to proxy for the quality of a country’s legal and enforcement regimes (e.g. Doidge,
Karolyi, and Stulz 2007; Byard, Li, and Yu 2011; Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 2013). A key feature
of the dataset and methodology is that it includes a margin of error for each country’s yearly
estimate, which the authors argue needs to be taken into account when making comparisons across

46

I also run a changes model using Regime even though I am unable to calculate the change and include this in column
(2) in Table 2.5.
47
Using this proxy I am able to include 5 additional deregistering firms in the tests, thus the sample sizes in the two
columns in Table 2.5 are not equal. Excluding these 5 firms in the model that uses RuleLaw does not significantly
alter the results.
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countries. The U.S. is used as the benchmark and I classify any country-year with an upper-bound
percentile rank greater or equal to the U.S.’s upper-bound rank (higher ranks indicating a more
stringent legal environment) as having a comparable legal regime. As such, I set values of
RuleLaw equal to 1 for these country-year observations and 0 otherwise.
The dependent variable is now the change in audit fees from the year before deregistration
to the year after deregistration, removing the year of deregistration from the analysis. For the
sample of deregistering firms only the model is:
Ln(AuditFees)t+1 - Ln(AuditFees)t-1 = β0 + β1∆RuleLaw + β2∆Complexity +
δControls + Fixed Effects + e

(7),

where t is the year of deregistration. As this model only includes deregistering firms, there is no
need to include an indicator variable for change of cross-listing status. The two variables of
interest are ∆RuleLaw and ∆Complexity. The former takes the value of 1 for firms returning to
legal environments less stringent than the U.S., and thus experiencing a decrease in auditors’ legal
liability exposure, and 0 for firms returning to legal environments comparable to the U.S., and thus
experiencing no change in auditors’ legal liability exposure. The latter takes the value of 1 for
firms returning to non-IFRS accounting environments, and thus experiencing a decrease in audit
complexity and 0 for firms returning to IFRS environments, and thus, experiencing no change in
audit complexity. A negative coefficient on either variable indicates that the decrease in legal
liability or complexity, or both, is associated with a decrease in audit fees for deregistering firms.
The control variables are the same as those described above, but are measured as the change
from year t-1 to year t+1. For indicator variables, I follow the steps in Ghosh and Pawlewicz
(2009). For example, the Loss indicator is now represented by two separate indicator variables:
(1) NoLoss-to-Loss, which equals 1 for firms that reported no loss in year t-1, but reported a loss
in year t+1 and; (2) Loss-to-NoLoss, which equals 1 for firms that reported a loss in year t-1, but
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reported no loss in year t+1. Separate indicator variables for Acquisition, December, and Qualified
are created in a similar manner. Given the small sample size, if there are no observations that fall
into one of the newly created categories, then the variable is omitted from the regression output in
the tables.
The findings are presented in Table 2.5. Column (1) shows the results using RuleLaw to
proxy for legal liability in the home market; however, I also report the results using the original
proxy, Regime, in column (2). Table 2.5 shows that the change in audit fees from the year before
to the year after deregistration is not significantly associated with a change in legal liability. There
is no significant impact on audit fees for those firms experiencing a decrease in legal liability as
captured by ∆RuleLaw. However, for firms experiencing a decrease in complexity, which are
those firms that leave the U.S. to return to a non-IFRS home market, the coefficient on
∆Complexity is negative and statistically significant. These results confirm the earlier findings
that it is the decrease in audit complexity that is driving the decrease in audit fees after
deregistration. The lower R-squared value compared to the earlier tables is consistent with audit
fee change regressions (Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009).
For the sample that includes deregistering firms and the matched control group of nonderegistering firms, the model is:
Ln(AuditFees)t+1 - Ln(AuditFees)t-1 = β0 + β1∆Cross-listingStatus + β2∆RuleLaw +
β3∆Complexity + δControls + Fixed Effects + e

(8),

where t is the year of deregistration. As this model includes non-deregistering firms, an indicator
variable is needed to distinguish those firm year-observations for which the cross-listing status has
changed, i.e. the firm deregistered from the U.S. This is captured by ∆Cross-listingStatus which
is coded 1 for deregistering firms and 0 otherwise. The other two variables of interest, ∆RuleLaw
and ∆Complexity, are as defined above. In this model, I am unable to include interaction terms
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because non-deregistering firms experience no change in legal liability and complexity, as they
maintain a U.S. cross-listing and are continually exposed to the U.S. legal and accounting
environment.
The results are displayed in Table 2.6 which, similar to Table 2.5, includes a column using
the ∆RuleLaw proxy and a column using the Regime proxy.48 Consistent with the results in earlier
tables, I find that deregistration from the U.S. is associated with a negative and statistically
significant change in audit fees. Table 2.6 further shows that the source of this association is those
firms experiencing a decrease in audit complexity and not those firms experiencing a decrease in
legal liability. This analysis leads me to conclude that it is the change in audit complexity which
drives the change in audit fees for deregistering firms.
2.5.2 Alternative Proxies
The main results have shown that the legal liability in the home market, as measured by
the Wingate (1997) index or the World Bank’s Rule of Law index, is not a source of the negative
association between deregistration and accounting quality. To ensure that the results are not being
driven by the proxy choice, the tests described earlier are repeated using different measures to
capture the home market legal environment. I separately utilize the anti-director index, updated
by Spamann (2010), which measures the degree of shareholder protection in a country and the
anti-self-dealing index from Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), which
measures the extent to which minority shareholders are legally protected from insider self-dealing.
Additionally, I obtain from the World Bank’s database the classification of countries’ legal origins
(i.e. code versus common law).

The earlier results for both the level and change analyses are

48

Similar to the sample size in Table 2.5, the sample in Table 2.6 is affected by the choice of proxy. I include 5
additional deregistering and matched non-deregistering firms in the tests, thus the sample sizes in the two columns in
Table 2.6 are not equal. Excluding these 10 firms in the model that uses RuleLaw does not significantly alter the
results.
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robust to the use of each of these three alternative measures to capture the legal environment in a
home market (untabulated).
2.5.3 Long-Term Trends
The tests focus on the impact of deregistration on audit fees and as such, the main analysis
for deregistering firms only includes just the year before and year after deregistration from the
U.S. This shorter time period enables me to have a balanced panel of firm-year observations and
ensures the only major firm event in the time-period is deregistration from the U.S. However, to
be certain the results of the main tests are not one-year decreases in audit fees and instead represent
a shift in the auditor-client relationship as a result of the change in cross-listing status, I also repeat
the deregistering firm analyses extending the sample to include multiple years before and after
deregistration. In doing so, I create an unbalanced panel, as the year of deregistration varies, and
thus, some firms have more pre- than post-deregistration observations and vice versa. The results
of this analysis (untabulated) show the main results hold. There continues to exist a negative
association between deregistration and audit fees and the source of this association is the decrease
in audit complexity for non-IFRS firms and not the decrease in legal liability. However, as this
long-term analysis suffers from issues of potential additional confounding firm events that have
not been controlled for, the main tests focus on the shorter time frame surrounding deregistration.
2.5.4 Concurrent SEC Regulation Eliminating Reconciliation for IFRS Firms
One of these events that may influence the main results is the 2007 SEC ruling that
eliminated the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP for IFRS-using foreign firms. Given that after this
year, auditors of IFRS firms no longer needed to audit the U.S. GAAP reconciliation presented in
the financial statements, these firms may have already experienced a decrease in audit fees that is
then further unaffected by deregistration from the U.S. To examine the impact of the elimination
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of the U.S. GAAP reconciliation for IFRS users, I utilize the full set of sample and control firmyear observations. In the first regression, I include only the years 2006 (pre-elimination) and 2007
(post-elimination). I calculate the change in the dependent and independent variables over this
same time period and include an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for firms affected
by the reconciliation elimination (i.e. IFRS firms), and 0 otherwise. The results (untabulated) show
that, in the year around this regulation, IFRS firms experienced no significant incremental change
in their audit fees. Next, I conduct a difference-in-difference analysis for a longer-time series. The
model now contains an indicator variable for post-2007 observations and interacts this variable
with the treatment group (IFRS firms). I find (untabulated) that there is no significant association
between audit fees and the post-2007 period for IFRS firms cross-listed in the U.S. Thus, it does
not appear that this regulation change in 2007 significantly decreased audit fees for IFRS firms in
the U.S. and thus does not explain the earlier reported results that the significant decrease in audit
fees following deregistration is isolated to non-IFRS firms.
2.6

Conclusion
By incorporating an important element that did not exist at the time of their studies, namely

the growing use of IFRS, I extend the results in Seetharaman et al. (2002) and Choi et al. (2009)
to show the cross-listing audit fee premium disappears for firms whose audit complexity decreases
after deregistration (non-IFRS firms), while firms with no changes in complexity (IFRS firms)
experience no significant audit fee changes around deregistration. This result is attributable to the
significant changes in the accounting and auditing landscape brought about by IFRS adoption in
the past decade (Kim et al. 2012; DeGeorge et al. 2013).
This paper exploits the unique setting of deregistration from the U.S. By adding interactive
effects with institutional variables, I am able to determine the source of the negative association
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between deregistration and audit fees (e.g. Leuz 2003a). While there is self-selection involved in
the decision to voluntary deregister from the U.S., the setting allows me to conduct multiple levels
of analysis to ensure I capture post-deregistration effects only. I use the firm as its own control,
conduct a difference-in-difference test with matched non-deregistering firms, and compare both
the levels and changes in audit fees to mitigate the effect of concurrent changes in home country
economies and institutions and focus on the effect the firm’s departure from the U.S. has on audit
fees. The results in this paper extend and support the notion that the use of IFRS has impacted the
market of cross-border listings.
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of new Cross-Listings and Deregistrations on Major U.S. Exchanges from
2004-2013
This figure plots the new cross-listings and deregistrations from major U.S. stock exchanges (AMEX, NASDAQ, and
NYSE) from 2004 to 2013. The data is plotted as a percentage of total foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges. The
data is obtained from the World Federation of Exchanges, the online ADR directories of Bank of New York, Citibank,
and JP Morgan Chase, and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2009).

Cross-Listings and Deregistrations on Major U.S. Exchanges (as
% of total foreign listings)
9%
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Cross-Listings

2009

2010

Deregistrations

75

2011

2012

2013

Table 2.1: Sample composition
Panel A: Voluntary foreign firm deregistrations 2004-2013
Edgar Online I-Metrix Form 15F filings of voluntary & involuntary deregistrations
Bank of New York's, CitiBank's, & JP Morgan's internet ADR directories of terminations
Duplicates between two listings
Amendment to previously filed Form 15F
Firms incorporated in US
Firm listed on OTC only, never sold securities in the US
Deregistration due to merge & acquisition
Delisted by the exchange for violating listing standards
Deregistered debt securities only
Missing data in Worldscope
Financial firms
Canadian firms
Full Sample

439
352
(309)
(21)
(43)
(97)
(44)
(8)
(78)
(61)
(12)
(13)
105

This panel reports how the final sample of 105 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from the U.S. was obtained.
Form 15F filings of all foreign firm deregistrations was collected from the Edgar Online I-Metrix database. This was
supplemented with listings of terminated ADR programs on Bank of New York, Citibank, and JP Morgan’s websites.
Duplicates between the four sources of deregistering foreign firms were removed. The sample is further restricted by
eliminating any firms incorporated in the U.S. The population of Form 15F filings obtained from Edgar contained
some amendments to previously filed Form 15F’s and as such are excluded. Firms that were listed on the OTC only
were eliminated to limit the sample to firms required to regularly file with the SEC. Involuntary deregistrations are
those due to merger and acquisitions or violations of listing standards. Those firms that deregistered debt securities
only are also excluded. Finally, financial firms, firms without sufficient data in Worldscope, and Canadian firms are
removed.
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Panel B: Sample by year and country
Voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from the U.S. by Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

8
6
10
45
10
11
5
4
2
4
105

Voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from the U.S. by country (with IFRS adoption year)
AUSTRALIA (2005)
6
NETHERLANDS (2005)
AUSTRIA (2005)
1
NEW ZEALAND (2007)
BELGIUM (2005)
1
NORWAY (2007)
CHILE (2009)
1
PORTUGAL (2005)
FINLAND (2005)
3
SINGAPORE (n/a)
FRANCE (2005)
12 SOUTH AFRICA (2005)
GERMANY (2005)
13 SPAIN (2005)
HONG KONG (2005)
5
SWEDEN (2005)
INDIA (n/a)
1
SWITZERLAND (n/a)
ITALY (2005)
4
UNITED KINGDOM (2005)
JAPAN (n/a)
10

5
4
3
1
2
2
1
3
4
23
105

This panel breaks down the 105 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations by year and country. Next to each country is
the year of mandatory IFRS adoption within the jurisdiction, if applicable.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics

ln(Audit Fees)
IFRS
Regime
ln(Assets)
Inv_Rec
ROA
Current Ratio
Leverage
Loss
Ln(Bus Seg)
Ln(Geo Seg)
December YE
Acquisition
Qualified
Big4

Deregistering:
Pre-Deregistration
N
Mean
Median
105
15.659
15.758
105
0.686
1.000
105
1.910
1.828
105
22.519
22.739
105
0.246
0.243
105
-0.007
0.038
105
2.750
1.421
105
0.626
0.607
105
0.229
0.000
105
1.106
1.099
105
1.229
1.609
105
0.619
1.000
105
0.867
1.000
105
0.000
0.000
105
0.943
1.000

N
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105

Deregistering:
Post-Deregistration
Mean
Median
14.907 **
15.202 **
0.719
1.000
1.910
1.828
22.549
22.794
0.251
0.251
-0.030
0.038
2.348
1.307
0.644
0.599
0.286
0.000
1.145
1.386
1.157
1.386
0.619
1.000
0.857
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.943
1.000

This panel details the characteristics of the 105 foreign firms that voluntary deregistered from U.S. exchanges from
2004-2013. Deregistering firms are compared in the year before deregistration to the year after deregistration, with
the year of deregistration removed from the analysis. All firm-level data are obtained from Worldscope, except as
noted below. Ln(Audit Fees) is the natural logarithm of audit fees. IFRS is an indicator variable coded 1 for firm-years
in which financial statements were prepared according to IFRS and 0 otherwise. Regime is the natural logarithm of
the Wingate (1997) index. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Inv_Rec is the ratio of the sum of
inventories and receivables to total assets. ROA is the ratio of the net income to total assets. Current Ratio is the ratio
of current assets to current liabilities. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Loss is an indicator variable that
takes the value of 1 for firm-year observations with negative earnings, and 0 otherwise. Ln(Bus Seg) and Ln(Geo Seg)
are the natural logarithms of the number of business and geographic segments, respectively. DecemberYE is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with a December fiscal yearend, and 0 otherwise. Acquisition is
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has acquired or disposed of a subsidiary or associate, and 0
otherwise. Qualified is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm received a qualified audit opinion and
0 otherwise. Big4 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm was audited by a Big-4 auditor and 0
otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate that deregistering firms’ characteristics before deregistration are significantly
different from their characteristics after deregistration at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Levels analyses—deregistering firms

Post
Regime

ln(Audit Fees)

ln(Audit Fees)

ln(Audit Fees)

ln(Audit Fees)

(1)
-0.640***
(3.60)
-2.092
(1.26)

(3)
-1.491***
(3.54)
-1.683
(1.09)

0.910
(1.27)

(2)
-0.848*
(1.67)
-2.196
(1.30)
0.109
(0.40)
0.942
(1.27)

0.662***
(13.13)
0.866
(1.28)
0.317
(1.17)
0.072
(0.47)
0.020
(0.83)
0.219
(1.26)
0.025
(0.24)
-0.021
(0.23)
-0.013
(0.05)
0.099
(0.19)
0.162
(0.83)
7.332**
(2.03)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.97
210

0.663***
(13.21)
0.860
(1.27)
0.310
(1.14)
0.075
(0.49)
0.021
(0.85)
0.225
(1.30)
0.023
(0.23)
-0.017
(0.18)
-0.015
(0.06)
0.104
(0.20)
0.164
(0.83)
7.551**
(2.04)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.97
210

(4)
-0.974*
(1.84)
-1.354
(0.93)
-0.309
(0.94)
-0.012
(0.02)
1.212***
(2.62)
0.650***
(14.68)
0.964
(1.65)
0.291
(1.13)
0.065
(0.43)
0.008
(0.37)
0.185
(1.14)
0.023
(0.24)
-0.027
(0.31)
-0.123
(0.57)
0.249
(0.54)
0.197
(1.14)
4.286
(1.28)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.97
210

Post*Regime
IFRS
Post*IFRS
ln(Assets)
Inv_Rec
Leverage
ROA
Current Ratio
Loss
Ln(Bus Seg)
Ln(Geo Seg)
Acquisition
Big 4
December YE
Intercept
Country FE
Year FE
Industry FE
R2
N

0.144
(0.20)
1.118***
(2.69)
0.655***
(14.34)
0.939
(1.61)
0.274
(1.06)
0.075
(0.49)
0.011
(0.49)
0.205
(1.26)
0.019
(0.20)
-0.016
(0.19)
-0.121
(0.57)
0.249
(0.54)
0.198
(1.15)
5.096
(1.49)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.97
210

In this table deregistering firms are compared before and after deregistration. The dependent variable in the OLS
regression is Ln(Audit Fees) as defined in Table 2.2. Post is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all
observations after deregistration from the U.S. and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 2.2. The
t-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the coefficients. They are adjusted for clustering on firms. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.4: Difference-in-difference—deregistering & matched non-deregistering firms
ln(Audit Fees) ln(Audit Fees) ln(Audit Fees) ln(Audit Fees)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Post
-0.054
0.124
-0.001
0.103
(0.43)
(0.34)
(0.00)
(0.27)
Dereg
0.305***
0.534**
0.269***
0.489**
(4.09)
(2.30)
(2.66)
(2.05)
Post*Dereg
-0.521***
-0.681
-1.049***
-0.971**
(3.70)
(1.50)
(3.86)
(2.06)
Regime
0.364***
0.377***
0.360***
0.374***
(5.20)
(5.30)
(5.14)
(5.26)
Post*Regime
-0.025
-0.015
(0.52)
(0.31)
Dereg*Regime
-0.032
-0.031
(1.04)
(1.02)
Post*Dereg*Regime
0.022
-0.017
(0.36)
(0.27)
IFRS
-0.079
-0.067
-0.187
-0.192
(0.45)
(0.38)
(0.95)
(0.97)
Post*IFRS
-0.05
-0.035
(0.19)
(0.13)
Dereg*IFRS
0.054
0.063
(0.38)
(0.45)
Post*Dereg*IFRS
0.677**
0.717**
(2.10)
(2.15)
ln(Assets)
0.717***
0.712***
0.725***
0.720***
(39.01)
(37.52)
(37.92)
(36.62)
Inv_Rec
1.263***
1.255***
1.256***
1.256***
(4.30)
(4.26)
(4.28)
(4.27)
Leverage
0.051
0.051
0.061
0.067
(0.97)
(0.98)
(1.17)
(1.26)
ROA
-0.205
-0.201
-0.218
-0.223
(1.13)
(1.09)
(1.20)
(1.22)
Current Ratio
-0.055***
-0.055***
-0.053***
-0.053***
(6.77)
(6.78)
(6.50)
(6.48)
Loss
0.118
0.109
0.131
0.116
(1.32)
(1.21)
(1.46)
(1.29)
Ln(Bus Seg)
0.072
0.067
0.068
0.062
(1.57)
(1.45)
(1.47)
(1.35)
Ln(Geo Seg)
-0.016
-0.014
-0.018
-0.017
(0.33)
(0.29)
(0.38)
(0.35)
Acquisition
0.000
0.003
-0.013
-0.008
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.15)
(0.09)
Big 4
0.379*
0.373*
0.366*
0.354*
(1.83)
(1.80)
(1.76)
(1.70)
December YE
0.530***
0.525***
0.539***
0.532***
(5.01)
(4.94)
(5.11)
(5.03)
Qualified
0.197
0.174
0.168
0.138
(0.37)
(0.33)
(0.32)
(0.26)
Intercept
-3.721***
-3.715***
-3.816***
-3.804***
(3.41)
(3.40)
(3.50)
(3.48)
80

Country FE
Year FE
Industry FE
R2
N

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.90
942

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.90
942

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.91
942

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.91
942

In this panel deregistering firms are compared after deregistration to a matched sample of non-deregistering crosslisted firms. Dereg is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all deregistering firms (i.e. treatment firms)
and 0 for all non-deregistering firms (i.e. control firms) throughout the entire sample period. Post is an indicator
variable that takes the value of 1 for all observations after the year of deregistration for deregistering firms or pseudoyear of deregistration for matched non-deregistering firms and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table
2.2. The t-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the coefficients. They are adjusted for clustering on firms. ***,
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Audit fee changes—deregistering firms only
ln(AF)t+1 - ln(AF)t-1
(1)
ΔRuleLaw
-0.389
(0.67)
Regime
ΔComplexity
Δln(Assets)
ΔInvRec
ΔLeverage
ΔROA
ΔCurrent Ratio
Loss-to-NoLoss
NoLoss-to-Loss
Acq-to-NoAcq
NoAcq-to-Acq
ΔLn(Bus Seg)
ΔLn(Geo Seg)
Intercept
Country FE
Year FE
Industry FE
R2
N

ln(AF)t+1 - ln(AF)t-1
(2)

-0.936***
(2.75)
0.548***
(3.16)
2.553**
(2.20)
0.516
(0.85)
0.440
(0.80)
0.054
(0.96)
-0.196
(0.84)
0.312*
(1.71)
0.011
(0.05)
-0.175
(0.71)
0.124
(1.34)
0.002
(0.02)
0.129
(0.71)
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.497
(0.50)
-0.936***
(2.70)
0.545***
(3.08)
2.539**
(2.16)
0.514
(0.81)
0.441
(0.78)
0.054
(0.88)
-0.195
(0.82)
0.312*
(1.68)
0.007
(0.03)
-0.174
(0.69)
0.122
(1.29)
0.001
(0.01)
1.325
(0.60)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.43
110

0.41
105

In this table, the dependent variable in the OLS regression is ∆Ln(Audit Fees) which is the difference in audit fees
from year t-1 to year t+1. ∆RuleLaw takes the value of 1 for all firms that experienced a decrease in legal liability
relative to the U.S. after deregistration, and 0 otherwise using the World Bank Rule of Law index. ∆Complexity takes
the value of 1 for all firms that returned to non-IFRS home markets, and thus experienced a decrease in complexity
after deregistration, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 2.2. The t-statistics are listed in
parenthesis below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 2.6: Audit fee changes—deregistering firms & matched non-deregistering firms
ln(AF)t+1 - ln(AF)t-1
ln(AF)t+1 - ln(AF)t-1
(1)
(2)
ΔCross-listing status
-0.544***
-0.640***
(5.37)
(8.02)
ΔRuleLaw
-0.159
(0.99)
Regime
0.135
(0.24)
ΔComplexity
-0.427**
-0.436**
(2.04)
(2.1)
Δln(Assets)
0.527***
0.523***
(4.48)
(4.48)
ΔInvRec
1.742**
1.640**
(2.14)
(2.03)
ΔLeverage
0.091
-0.021
(0.22)
(0.05)
ΔROA
0.162
0.206
(0.39)
(0.49)
ΔCurrent Ratio
0.03
0.017
(0.68)
(0.37)
Loss-to-NoLoss
-0.255
-0.263
(1.57)
(1.62)
NoLoss-to-Loss
0.191
0.207
(1.44)
(1.57)
Acq-to-NoAcq
0.016
0.026
(0.11)
(0.17)
NoAcq-to-Acq
0.041
0.06
(0.25)
(0.37)
Dec-to-NoDec
-0.247
-0.18
(0.37)
(0.28)
Unqualified-to-Qualified
0.021
0.021
(0.03)
(0.03)
ΔLn(Bus Seg)
0.094
0.085
(1.25)
(1.11)
ΔLn(Geo Seg)
-0.059
-0.059
(0.91)
(0.91)
Intercept
0.600***
0.317
(3.82)
(0.25)
Country FE
Yes
Yes
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
2
R
0.50
0.51
N
220
210
In this table, deregistering firms are compared in the year after deregistration to a matched sample of firms that did
not deregister. ∆Cross-listingStatus takes the value of 1 for all deregistering firms and 0 otherwise. All other variables
are as defined in Table 2.2 or Table 2.5. The t-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the coefficients. They are
adjusted for clustering on firms. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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